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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, as the agricultural system became in-
creasingly industrialized and the steps from farm to plate multiplied,1 
consumers became farther removed from the sources of their food.2 Until 
recently, most consumers in America were content to eat their processed, 
cheap, and filling foods without giving a second thought to how these 
foods were produced. The tides are changing. Increasingly, consumers 
are calling for more transparency in the food system.3 Repulsed by imag-
es of animal cruelty and shocked by unsavory food production practices, 
consumers want the food industry’s veil lifted and are demanding chang-
es in food production. The booming success of restaurants such as 
Chipotle, “the food industry’s fastest-rising star,”4 which serves “natural-
ly-raised” meats and is committed to sourcing “Food with Integrity,”5 is 
evidence of this consumer demand for higher quality food. 
Undercover activists and outspoken food system critics can be cred-
ited with inciting this food revolution. The agricultural industry is wag-
ing war on two fronts in response—one aimed at the market and public 
opinion, and the other at the legislature. In response to falling earnings, 
                                                            
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. 
 1. See generally Martha Dragich, Do You Know What’s on Your Plate: The Importance of 
Regulating the Processes of Food Production, 28 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 385 (2013). 
 2. See Susan A. Schneider, Reconnecting Consumers and Producers: On the Path Toward a 
Sustainable Food and Agriculture Policy, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 75, 78 (2010). 
 3. See Elizabeth S. Mitchell, Honesty Really is the Best Policy: Consumer Demand for Trans-
parency Reaches New Heights, ADWEEK (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/prnewser/honesty 
-really-is-the-best-policy-consumer-demand-for-transparency-and-honesty-reaches-new-heights/763 
40. 
 4. Sam Frizell, CMO: Chipotle’s Successful Because It’s Been ‘Very Consistent’, TIME (July 
22, 2014), http://time.com/3020462/chipotle-earnings-cmo/. 
 5. Joe Satran, Steve Ells, Chipotle Founder, Reflects on McDonald’s, GMOs and the First 20 
Years of His Chain, HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/07/12/steve-ells-chipotle-20th-anniversary_n_3583927.html. 
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evidence of consumer distrust of “large” companies, and consumer pref-
erences for “natural” foods, “Big-Ag” is attempting to rebrand itself 
through campaigns which pull back the curtain on the reality of its food 
production. For example, Alliance for Ranchers and McDonald’s have 
launched transparency campaigns to “open the dialogue” between con-
sumers and producers.6 On the other front, there are efforts to silence 
those exposing the truth behind the industrial food system and “seeking 
to raise legitimate questions about the safety of our nation’s food sup-
ply.”7 As consumers increasingly call for more information about where 
their food comes from and how it is produced, there has been a resur-
gence of “ag-gag” and “veggie libel” laws, which raise significant First 
Amendment concerns. 
Since the 1990s, the agricultural industry has used various pieces of 
state-level legislation such as “farm protection” and “agriculture dispar-
agement” laws to limit media. Farm protection, or “ag-gag,” laws are 
crafted to limit access to agriculture facilities, and specifically restrict the 
use of audio and video recording of working agriculture operations.8 Ag-
riculture disparagement, or “veggie libel,” laws are designed to limit 
what media and individuals can say about agriculture products and pro-
duction practices.9 Nine states have passed ag-gag laws and thirteen 
states have veggie libel statutes.10 
In 1998, Professor Bederman wrote: 
Food libel and agricultural disparagement statutes represent a legal 
attempt to insulate an economic sector from criticism . . . . In this 
respect, they may be strikingly successful in chilling the speech of 
anyone concerned about the food we eat. . . . Scientists and con-
sumer advocates must be able to express their legitimate, even if 
unproven, concerns. Food libel quells just that type of speech. At 
bottom, any restriction on speech about the quality and safety of our 
food is dangerous, unconstitutional, and undemocratic.11 
Decades later, veggie libel laws are still on the books in several states,12 
and one has recently been invoked in a high-profile lawsuit.13 
                                                            
 6. See infra Part VII. 
 7. Michele Simon, Veggie Libelous: Free Speech at Stake in Oprah Winfrey Trial, KNIGHT 
RIDDER NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 1998), available at http://www.appetiteforprofit.com/docs/veggie_ 
libelous.html. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 11. David J. Bederman, Food Libel: Litigating Scientific Uncertainty in a Constitutional Twi-
light Zone, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 191, 231 (1998). 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
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In 2011, the New York Times editorial board expressed similarly 
strong opposition to ag-gag laws: “The legislation has only one purpose: 
to hide factory-farming conditions from a public that is beginning to 
think seriously about animal rights and the way food is produced. . . . We 
need to know more about what goes on behind those closed doors, not 
less.”14 Since that criticism was written, five states passed ag-gag laws 
and five bills were introduced in 2015.15 
This Article discusses the increased call for transparency of the 
food system by consumers and the resulting resurgence of “ag-gag” and 
“veggie libel” laws aimed at silencing critics. This Article evaluates the 
legal measures (enactment of ag-gag and veggie libel laws) and non-legal 
efforts (marketing and advertising campaigns) in response to those seek-
ing greater transparency in the food system. Although promoting and 
protecting agriculture is a worthy goal, the means by which the laws at-
tempt to do so violate the First Amendment, which recognizes a “pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”16 This Article con-
cludes that the controversy surrounding food production is evidence of 
the significant public interest in “allowing vigorous and open debate 
about the industry’s practices.”17 As Professor Ronald K.L. Collins has 
argued: 
As with political expression, public discourse about food needs to 
be robust in order that diverse and challenging forms of infor-
mation—from skeptical opinions to “hard science”—may find ex-
pression in the marketplace. This model of communication, so vital 
to our culture, cannot co-exist with laws designed to silence public 
criticism of food in order to secure a particular industry’s monetary 
goals. The marketplace of ideas principle malfunctions insofar as 
the free speech liberties of a community succumb to isolated eco-
nomic interests.18 
                                                                                                                                     
 13. See Complaint and Jury Demand, Beef Prods., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., No. 
CIV12292, 2012 WL 4017340 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter BPI Complaint]. 
 14. Editorial, Hiding the Truth About Factory Farms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/opinion/27wed3.html?_r=0. 
 15. Ag Gag: Safeguarding Industry Secrets by Punishing the Messenger, FOOD INTEGRITY 
CAMPAIGN, http://www.foodwhistleblower.org/campaign/ag-gag/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). This 
Article reflects developments through February 20, 2015. 
 16. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 17. Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-
00104 (D. Idaho Nov. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Idaho MSJ]. 
 18. Ronald K.L. Collins, Free Speech, Food Libel, & the First Amendment . . . in Ohio, 26 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000). 
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Part II provides an overview of farm protection, or “ag-gag,” and 
food disparagement, or “veggie libel,” laws. Part III explains that alt-
hough trespass and fraud are already crimes, and the majority of states 
have enacted defamation and product disparagement statutes, these laws 
have been “re-tooled” as “farm protection” or “food disparagement” 
laws, which operate uniquely in the context of agricultural production. 
Part IV discusses the purposes of the laws to evaluate the question of 
whether the agricultural industry requires special protection. Part V pre-
sents recent data regarding consumers’ demand for transparency. Part VI 
evaluates the food industry’s efforts to protect its public image through 
ag-gag and veggie libel laws. This Part summarizes the extensive legal 
commentary, which overwhelmingly concludes that these laws cannot 
pass constitutional muster. Finally, Part VII examines the industry’s re-
branding and transparency efforts and concludes that greater, not less, 
information about food production is necessary to improve the food sys-
tem, ensure humane treatment of farm animals, meet consumer demand, 
and truly protect the agriculture industry. 
II. PROTECTING THE AG INDUSTRY: AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION & 
DISPARAGEMENT ACTS 
A. Ag-Gag Laws 
1. Overview of Ag-Gag Laws 
In response to break-ins at animal research facilities, the first ani-
mal enterprise interference laws were passed in the early 1990s.19 Ap-
proximately twenty-eight states have enacted such laws to protect animal 
facilities from animal welfare activists.20 These state animal enterprise 
interference laws, along with the federal Animal Enterprise Terrorism 
Act (AETA) of 2006,21 target physical damage at animal facilities and 
provide heightened penalties for fraud, trespass, and damage at animal 
enterprise facilities.22 The animal enterprise statutes in Kansas,23 Mon-
                                                            
 19. Cynthia F. Hodges, Detailed Discussion of State Animal “Terrorism”/Animal Enterprise 
Interference Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CENTER (2011), https://www.animallaw.info/article/ 
detailed-discussion-state-animal-terrorismanimal-enterprise-interference-laws. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. AETA criminalizes the intentional loss of real or personal property of an animal enter-
prise. Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 109-374, 120 Stat. 2652 (2006) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 43 (2006)). 
 22. Hodges, supra note 19. These statutes typically define animal enterprise facilities to in-
clude at least both livestock farms and animal testing facilities. Id. 
 23. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch.1). 
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tana,24 and North Dakota25 also criminalized unauthorized filming at an-
imal facilities, thus targeting undercover investigations on agricultural 
operations. Kansas’s statute bans taking photographs or video at an ani-
mal facility “with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the 
animal facility.”26 Montana’s statute similarly bans photo or video re-
cording in an animal facility with the intent to damage the enterprise and 
the “intent to commit criminal defamation.”27 In comparison, North Da-
kota’s statute imposes liability for unauthorized use of recording equip-
ment at an animal facility regardless of intent or damages.28 
Since these laws were passed in the 1990s, “almost thirty states 
have introduced bills banning or restricting undercover investigations 
surrounding the abuse of farmed animals.”29 These “ag-gag” statutes, so 
called for their purpose and effect,30 have passed in nine states including 
Missouri,31 Iowa,32 Tennessee,33 Utah,34 Idaho,35 and Wyoming.36 In Jan-
uary 2015, similar bills were introduced in five states.37 
While all the ag-gag laws are intended to restrict undercover inves-
tigations, they take different forms. Generally, the most recent statutes 
are drafted to include one or more of the following provisions38: the ban 
                                                            
 24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular Sess.). 
 25. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Regular Sess.). 
 26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch.1). 
 27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular Sess.). 
 28. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02(6) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Regular Sess.). 
 29. Michael McFadden, Exposing Ag-Gag, FARM FORWARD (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://farmforward.com/2014/11/07/exposing-ag-gag/. The Idaho Dairymen’s Association states that 
“Idaho may have created a blueprint that could be duplicated in other states and provided momentum 
for agricultural producers across the country to work towards protecting themselves as well.” 2014 
Idaho Legislative Update, IDAHO DAIRYMEN’S ASS’N, http://www.idahodairymens.org/2014-idaho-
legislative-update/ (last visited May 2, 2015). 
 30. See Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at A27, availa-
ble at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals. 
 31. MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Regular Sess.). 
 32. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular Sess.). 
 33. “[Tennessee] [i]ntroduced legislation in 2013, which was passed by Legislature but vetoed 
by Governor. [Tennessee] [i]ntroduced legislation again in 2014, which failed.” Ag-Gag Bills at the 
State Level, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower-
suppression-legislation/ag-gag-bills-state-level (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Ag-Gag Bills 
at the State Level]. 
 34. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.). 
 35. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 58). 
 36. Act of Mar. 5, 2015, 2015 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 146 (S.F. 12). 
 37. Those states include Colorado, Missouri, Montana, Washington, and Wyoming. As of 
March 2015, Wyoming has passed an ag-gag law. Act of Mar. 5, 2015, 2015 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 
146 (S.F. 12). See Ag Gag: Safeguarding Industry Secrets by Punishing the Messenger, FOOD 
INTEGRITY CAMPAIGN, http://www.foodwhistleblower.org/campaign/ag-gag/ (last visited May 2, 
2015); Ag-Gag Bills at the State Level, supra note 33. 
 38. Ag-Gag Bills at the State Level, supra note 33. 
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of photography/video filming on facility premises (often called bans on 
“agricultural interference”); the criminalization of securing an agricultur-
al job under fraudulent or false pretenses (“agricultural production facili-
ty fraud”);39 and mandatory reporting of documented abuse within a 
short time frame.40 
The influx of ag-gag law proposals across the country has coincided 
with increased media attention surrounding farming practices exposed by 
undercover investigations. Undercover investigators and activists often 
gain access to these facilities by obtaining employment at an agricultural 
production facility to record and document conditions inside animal 
farms.41 Since 1998, animal activists have conducted at least seventy-six 
undercover investigations at egg, pork, chicken, beef, dairy, deer, duck, 
turkey, and fish farms across the nation.40 In Iowa alone, activists have 
conducted ten such investigations.42 Just as Upton Sinclair’s vivid image-
ry of conditions at Chicago slaughterhouses brought food production to 
the forefront of a national conversation,43 so too have reports and videos 
of animal abuse and unsanitary food practices. The aim of these animal 
protection groups is to reveal and publicize illegal or inhumane treatment 
towards farm animals and gain public support for more humane practic-
es.44 Their investigations have revealed major violations of food safety 
and humane farming practices, prompting action by both the United 
                                                            
 39. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular Sess.). 
 40. MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Regular Sess.) (requiring 
employees of animal agricultural operations that videotape what they suspect is animal abuse to 
provide the recording to a law enforcement agency within twenty-four hours). 
 41. See, e.g., Eliza Barclay, States Crack Down on Animal Welfare Activists and Their Under-
cover Videos, NPR (Mar. 1, 2012, 1:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/02/29/1476510 
02/states-crack-down-on-animal-welfare-activists-and-their-undercover-videos. 
 42. Ag-Gag Laws and Factory Farm Investigations Mapped: 2014, ANIMAL VISUALS, 
http://www.animalvisuals.org/projects/data/investigations#lawlist (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (doc-
umenting farm animal rights undercover investigations since 1998). 
 43. See UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906); FDA History—Part I, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm (last updated 
June 18, 2009). 
 44. Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How Unit-
ed States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
566, 567–68 (2014). See, e.g., Undercover Investigations: Exposing Animal Abuse, MERCY FOR 
ANIMALS, http://www.mercyforanimals.org/investigations.aspx (last visited May 2, 2015) (describ-
ing recent undercover investigations undertaken by Mercy for Animals). See also GLYNN T. TONSOR 
& NICOLE J. OLYNK, U.S. MEAT DEMAND: THE INFLUENCE OF ANIMAL WELFARE MEDIA 
COVERAGE (2010), available at http://www.agmanager.info/livestock/marketing/animalwelfare/ 
MF2951.pdf (finding that media attention to animal welfare issues has reduced demand for pork and 
poultry). 
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States Department of Agriculture and by companies that purchase prod-
ucts from the facilities investigated.45 
For example, a 2007 Humane Society of the United States investi-
gation at a slaughterhouse in Chino, California that revealed abuse of 
downer cows spurred action across several fronts. The investigation re-
sulted in criminal charges,46 the largest meat recall in U.S. history,47 and 
a California ballot initiative banning intense farm confinement practic-
es.48 Additionally, a subsequent False Claims Act lawsuit related to 
fraudulent representations regarding treatment of animals in the facility 
settled for $155 million in reimbursements to the federal government.49 
In 2010, undercover investigators and federal inspectors separately 
investigated several of Iowa’s egg-producing farms.50 Similar farms in 
Idaho were involved in a Salmonella outbreak that led to the largest egg 
recall in United States history.51 In 2012, an undercover investigator 
working at Bettencourt Dairies’ Dry Creek Dairy in Idaho, captured au-
diovisual recordings of horrific abuse of dairy cows, including workers 
beating, kicking, and dragging cows.52 The video, released by an animal 
rights organization, led to widespread public outrage, loss of business, 
and negative publicity.53 
Due to the economic impact of these investigations, agricultural 
corporations in states such as Iowa, Utah, and Idaho have aggressively 
lobbied for greater protection in the form of ag-gag laws.54 Iowa’s ag-gag 
                                                            
 45. See, e.g., David Zahniser, Central Valley Slaughterhouse Reopens After Animal Abuse 
Claims, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012, 8:36 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/08/ 
central-valley-slaughterhouse-reopens.html. 
 46. Victoria Kim, Charges of Meat Plant Cruelty Filed, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2008), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/16/local/me-beef16. 
 47. United States ex rel. Humane Soc’y U.S. v. Hallmark Meat Packing Co., No. 08-0221, 
2013 WL 4713557 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2013). 
 48. Jonathan R. Lovvorn & Nancy V. Perry, California Proposition 2: A Watershed Moment 
for Animal Law, 15 ANIMAL L. 149, 156 (2009). 
 49. Owners of Infamous Calif. Slaughterhouse Pay Millions to Settle Government Fraud Case, 
HUMANE SOC’Y U.S. (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2013/11/ 
Hallmark_settlement_112713.html. 
 50. Lewis Bollard, Note, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of Laws Restricting Undercover 
Investigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10960, 10974–75 (2012). 
 51. Largest Egg Recall in U.S. History Brings Renewed Attention to Dangers of Industrial 
Farming, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/8/24/largest_ 
egg_recall_in_us_history. 
 52. Idaho Workers Charged with Animal Cruelty at Bettencourt Dairies’ Dry Creek Dairy, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012, 1:28 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/watch-
animal-cruelty-filmed-idaho-dairy-article-1.1180094. 
 53. See, e.g., Anna Almendrala, In-N-Out Responds to Animal Abuse Allegations Directed at 
Idaho Dairy Farm, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/ 
in-n-out-animal-abuse_n_1958505.html. 
 54. See infra Part IV.A. 
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bill, passed in March 2012, created the crime of “agricultural production 
facility fraud,” which occurs when a person enters a facility under false 
pretenses or makes a false representation to obtain employment at a facil-
ity with “intent to commit an act not authorized by the owner” of the fa-
cility.55 
Utah’s law directly restricts unauthorized recordings at animal fa-
cilities by creating a new crime called “agricultural operation interfer-
ence.”56 A person is guilty of this crime if she: (a) “knowingly or inten-
tionally” and without consent records images or sound at the agricultural 
operation by leaving a recording device there; (b) “obtains access to an 
agricultural operation under false pretenses”; (c) records images or sound 
at an agricultural operation, if she applied for employment at the opera-
tion with the intent to record there, and knew at the time of accepting 
employment that the owner prohibited such recordings; or (d) willfully 
records images of sound at an agricultural operation without consent 
while committing criminal trespass.57 
Idaho’s “Ag Security” law was easily “the most controversial agri-
culture bill” during the 2014 session.58 Drafted in response to the 2012 
Dry Creek Dairy incident, this law was pushed by the Idaho Dairymen’s 
Association, which represents every dairy farmer and dairy producer in 
the state.59 The law represents the most sweeping ag-gag legislation,60 
criminalizing employment-based investigations where employment is 
obtained through misrepresentation or omission, and investigations that 
involve any unauthorized videography at an animal agricultural facility.61 
2. Effect of the Ag-Gag Laws 
Regardless of the specific prohibitions included in an ag-gag stat-
ute, this type of legislation presents significant concerns to advocacy 
groups involved in issues such as civil liberties, public health, food safe-
ty, animal welfare, environmental protection, and workers’ rights.62 An-
imal rights activists, such as Mercy for Animals, which investigated egg 
                                                            
 55. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular Sess.). 
 56. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.). 
 57. Id. § 76-6-112(2)(a)–(d). 
 58. 2014 Idaho Legislative Update, supra note 29. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Idaho MSJ, supra note 17. 
 61. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 58). 
 62. See Statement of Opposition to Proposed “Ag-Gag” Laws from Broad Spectrum of Interest 
Groups, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower- 
suppression-legislation/statement-opposition (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
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farms in 2011, have indicated that the ag-gag laws have forced them to 
limit their activism in states that have enacted the laws.63 
Ag-gag laws have thus far been enforced against five animal activ-
ists.64 In February 2013, animal rights advocate Amy Meyer was the first 
to be charged under Utah’s law.65 While standing on public property ad-
jacent to a slaughterhouse, Meyer was arrested after she videotaped a 
sick cow being pushed by a track loader.66 Meyer’s case was later dis-
missed by Utah prosecutors after journalist Will Potter broke the story of 
“the first prosecution in the country” under an ag-gag law.67 In Septem-
ber 2014, four activists were arrested after taking photos of a pig farm in 
Utah, although charges were later dropped.68 As will be discussed in Part 
VI, these ag-gag laws are unconstitutional, raise food safety concerns, 
and are also ineffective. 
B. Veggie Libel Laws 
1. Overview of Veggie Libel Laws 
The first veggie libel laws were enacted into state law in the 1990s. 
Although they have been broadly criticized as unconstitutional free 
speech constraints since their enactment,69 thirteen states—Alabama, 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas—have adopt-
ed some form of these laws.70 Of these, only Colorado criminalizes food 
disparagement.71 
                                                            
 63. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/taping-of-farm-cruelty-is-becoming-the-crime.html. 
 64. Lindsay Whitehurst, 4 Charged Under Utah’s Controversial ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, WASH. TIMES 
(Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/8/4-charged-under-utahs-
controversial-ag-gag-law/. 
 65. Will Potter, First “Ag-Gag” Prosecution: Utah Woman Filmed a Slaughterhouse from the 
Public Street, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/first-
ag-gag-arrest-utah-amy-meyer/6948/. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; Will Potter, Amy Meyer’s Ag-Gag Charges Have Been Dropped!, GREEN IS THE NEW 
RED (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/amy-meyer-charges-dropped/6998/. 
 68. Libby Blanchard, Op-Ed: Get Rid of Utah’s Unconstitutional ‘Ag-Gag’ Law, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (Jan. 16, 2015, 4:45 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/2059454-155/op-ed-get-rid-of-utahs-
unconstitutional. 
 69. See infra Part VI. 
 70. Louisiana was the first state to pass its veggie libel statute, in 1991. See LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 3:4501–04 (Westlaw through 2014 Regular Sess.). Idaho passed its law in 1992; Alabama 
and Georgia in 1993. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-2001 to -2003 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 58); 
ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-620 to -25 (Westlaw through 2015 Act 2015-16); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-16-1 to -4 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Acts 2–8, 10). In 1994, Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, and South 
Dakota passed their veggie libel laws. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 35-31-101, 104 (West, Westlaw 
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The origins of veggie libel laws are well documented. Most schol-
ars attribute the Alar incident of 1989 as the catalyst for the laws.72 In 
1989, CBS aired a 60 Minutes episode “‘A’ is for Apple,” which exposed 
the dangers of Daminozide, or “Alar,” a chemical sprayed on apples to 
enhance their growth and color.73 The episode was based on a report 
from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) finding that Alar 
was a dangerous carcinogen, and that children were particularly at risk of 
developing cancer later in life because they generally eat more fruit and 
retain more of what they eat in comparison to adults.74 The episode led to 
a public outcry against Alar and the apple industry, resulting in the loss 
of millions of dollars.75 
In response to the impact on apple sales, Washington State apple 
growers sued CBS in 1990 alleging false disparagement of their prod-
ucts.76 The growers claimed that warnings regarding the carcinogenic 
effects of Alar were false because studies had only confirmed the car-
cinogenic effect on animals.77 Under defamation law, the growers as 
plaintiffs were unable to prove falsity; therefore, the lower court granted 
CBS’s motion for summary judgment.78 The decision was affirmed on 
appeal.79 
As a result of its defeat in court, the agricultural industry argued 
that current libel and product disparagement laws were inadequate to 
address the vulnerable nature of its products.80 In response, the American 
Feed Industry Association (AFIA), a lobbying group for the cattle feed 
                                                                                                                                     
through 2015 ch. 2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Regular Sess.); 
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1-251, 253, 255, 257 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.); S.D. 
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Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.). 
 71. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-31-104 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 2). 
 72. See, e.g., Bederman, supra note 11, at 192. 
 73. 60 Minutes: ‘A’ is for Apple (CBS television broadcast Feb. 26, 1989). For a transcript of 
the broadcast, see Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes” (Auvil I), 800 F. Supp. 928, 937 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
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U.S. 1167 (1996). 
 75. Id. at 819. 
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 77. Id. at 821. 
 78. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes” (Auvil II), 836 F. Supp. 740, 743 (E.D. Wash. 1993). 
 79. Auvil III, 67 F.3d at 818. 
 80. David J. Bederman et al., Of Banana Bills and Veggie Hate Crimes: The Constitutionality 
of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 144 (1997). 
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and pet food industries, hired a Washington, D.C. law firm to draft model 
legislation to better protect the industry’s economic interests.81 The agri-
cultural industry successfully argued for a “tailor-made cause of action 
for agricultural disparagement.”82 
Although each of the laws differ slightly,83 the veggie libel statutes 
generally provide standing to sue to a “producer” of the allegedly dispar-
aged perishable food who has suffered damages from the libel.84 Some 
states, such as Ohio, broadly define “producer” as “a person who grows, 
raises, produces, distributes, or sells a perishable agricultural or 
aquacultural food product.”85 Georgia provides a cause of action to “the 
entire chain from grower to consumer.”86 
The veggie libel statutes generally provide liability for compensato-
ry damages and other “appropriate” relief87 if a person disseminates to 
the public statements that either include false information or are consid-
ered to be “disparaging” regarding the safety of an agricultural food 
product for consumption.88 To be liable in Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, 
South Dakota, and Texas, the disseminator must either have had actual 
knowledge, or must have “know[n] or should have known” that false 
information was disseminated to the public “stat[ing] or impl[ying] that a 
perishable agricultural or aquacultural food product” is unsafe for human 
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 82. Bederman et al., supra note 80, at 144. 
 83. See Rita Marie Cain, Food, Inglorious Food: Food Safety, Food Libel and Free Speech, 49 
AM. BUS. L.J. 275, 323 (2012) (Appendix B provides an outline of each statutory provision). See 
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utes, in 1998 LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, LDRC BULLETIN, AGRICULTURAL 
DISPARAGEMENT LAWS 2, at 17, 22–25 (for a state-by-state analysis of agricultural disparagement 
statutes). 
 84. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Regular Sess.); IDAHO 
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 85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(B)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 File 1). 
 86. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Acts 2–8, 10). 
 87. ALA. CODE § 6-5-622 (Westlaw through 2015 Act 2015–16); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-
113(A) (Westlaw through 2015 First Regular Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 865.065(3) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 First Regular Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-3 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Acts 2–8, 
10); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4503 (Westlaw through 2014 Regular Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-
1-255 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(C) (West, 
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PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002(b) (West, Westlaw 2013 Third Called Sess.). 
 88. Bederman et al., supra note 80, at 146. 
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consumption.89 In contrast, Alabama and Oklahoma require no 
knowledge or awareness to make a statement actionable if the “false in-
formation” regarding the safety of a perishable food product for human 
consumption is disseminated to the public.90 Arizona, Georgia, and Flor-
ida require that the dissemination to the public of false information re-
garding the safety of a perishable food product be done in a “willful or 
malicious” manner.91 
Several state food libel statutes seem to place the burden of proving 
the truth of a disparaging statement on the defendant.92 Nine food libel 
statutes define falsity based on the speaker’s lack of scientific basis for a 
statement; however, these laws fail to define “scientific inquiry, facts, or 
data.”93 In other words, after a plaintiff alleges that a statement was dis-
paraging and false, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove it was 
based on scientific evidence, and therefore not false.94 In Louisiana, there 
is a presumption of falsity if a statement is not based on “reasonable and 
reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data.”95 Texas requires that “the trier 
of fact shall consider whether the information was based on reasonable 
and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data.”96 
                                                            
 89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1) (Westlaw through 2014 Regular Sess.); see also MISS. 
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2015 ch. 58); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.); S.D. 
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 94. Cain, supra note 83, at 281. 
 95. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4502(1) (Westlaw through 2014 Regular Sess.). 
 96. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.003 (West, Westlaw 2013 Third Called Sess.). 
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The Texas version of an agricultural disparagement statute gave rise 
to the first, and arguably the most famous, case involving agricultural 
product disparagement. In 1996, Texas beef producers sued Oprah Win-
frey, her production company, and one of her guests, Howard Lyman, for 
comments made during an episode dealing with dangerous foods; specif-
ically, claims were made that a large portion of American cattle herds 
were at risk for infection by bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, 
more commonly known as mad cow disease).97 During the show, Win-
frey remarked that the possibility of contracting mad cow disease made 
her afraid of eating beef, and that she was “stopped cold from eating an-
other burger.”98 The cattlemen challenged Lyman’s assertion that the 
effects of “‘Mad Cow Disease’ could make AIDS look like the common 
cold.”99 Beef producers also challenged Lyman’s accusation that the 
United States was “treating BSE as a public relations issue . . . and fail-
ing to take any ‘substantial’ measures to prevent a BSE outbreak in this 
country.”100 Lyman’s second statement relied on the continued practice 
of ruminant-to-ruminant feeding in the United States, which caused the 
BSE outbreak in Britain.101 As a result of the show, sales of beef in Texas 
dropped drastically.102 
Under the Texas agricultural disparagement statute, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant: (1) disseminated false information to the 
public about perishable food products; (2) stated or implied that the food 
product was not safe for human consumption; (3) knew that the infor-
mation was false; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiffs.103 The court 
ultimately held that live cattle were not “perishable” as defined by the 
statute and that the plaintiff failed to prove the remarks were in fact 
false.104 In reaching these conclusions, Judge Robinson of the Northern 
District of Texas noted: 
[The statements made on the Oprah Winfrey show] dealt with a 
matter of public concern. Statements of fact and opinion on the is-
sue of whether the feeding practices of American cattlemen on or 
before April 16, 1996, contributed to a danger that BSE or the dead-
ly and incurable new variant CJD could occur in the United States, 
                                                            
 97. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 682–85 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 98. Id. at 688 (internal quotations omitted). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 684. 
 103. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 96.002–004 (West, Westlaw 2013 Third Called 
Sess.). 
 104. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858, 862 (N.D. Tex. 1998). 
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cannot be considered as anything other than a matter of legitimate 
public concern. It would be difficult to conceive of any topic of dis-
cussion that could be of greater concern and interest to all Ameri-
cans than the safety of the food that they eat.105 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the plain-
tiffs did not knowingly disseminate false information about beef.106 De-
spite this holding that the plaintiff failed to prove feeding practices con-
tributed to the spread of mad cow disease, the FDA banned the use of 
ruminant-to-ruminant feed supplements just months after the show 
aired.107 
In AgriGeneral Co. v. Ohio Public Interest Research Group, a veg-
gie libel lawsuit filed soon after Winfrey, Ohio Public Interest Research 
Group (Ohio PIRG) and its director, Amy Simpson, alerted the public 
about the dangers of Buckeye Egg Farm’s practice of repacking and re-
dating eggs for sale to consumers.108 Unlike Winfrey, the truthfulness of 
those statements was not in dispute.109 At issue in the litigation were 
Simpson’s statements at a press conference: “To this date, we have no 
idea how many, if any, consumers have been made ill by consuming the-
se eggs.”110 Allegedly harmed by this statement, Buckeye sued Ohio 
PIRG and Simpson for compensatory and punitive damages, court costs, 
and attorneys’ fees.111 This caused an outrage among free speech advo-
cates.112 Due to public pressure, Buckeye Egg dropped its lawsuit a year 
later.113 
The applicability of South Dakota’s agricultural disparagement law 
is now at issue in a $1.2 billion high-profile lawsuit following reports of 
the meat industry’s use of “pink slime,” or Lean Finely Textured Beef 
                                                            
 105. Id. 
 106. Tex. Beef Grp., 201 F.3d at 688–89. 
 107. Id. at 688. 
 108. AgriGeneral Co. v. Ohio Pub. Interest Research Grp., No. 397CV7262 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 
25, 1997); see Collins, supra note 18, at 5. 
 109. Collins, supra note 18, at 5. 
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 111. Id. 
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Glasser of the American Civil Liberties Union and Michael Jacobson, executive director of the Cen-
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 113. Collins, supra note 18, at 5–6. 
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(LFTB). LFTB is a meat product allegedly made of low-grade meat, 
scraps, and waste, which is then exposed to ammonium hydroxide to kill 
contaminants such as E. coli.114 The term was first used in 2002 by Unit-
ed States Department of Agriculture (USDA) microbiologist Gerald 
Zirnstein in a private e-mail to a colleague.115 In September 2012, Beef 
Products, Inc. (BPI), a meat processor headquartered in South Dakota, 
sued American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC) and others for def-
amation over their coverage of this practice.116 On March 7, 2012, ABC 
broadcasted a segment on its evening news program about LFTB and 
followed the segment with eleven additional reports and numerous online 
communications concerning LFTB and BPI.117 In these reports, ABC 
personalities repeatedly referred to LFTB as “pink slime.”118 
The public’s response against BPI “was immediate and intense.”119 
As blogger and plaintiff Bettina Elias Siegel explained, “[T]he use of 
LFTB in ground beef is ‘one of those practices that can thrive only in 
obscurity.’”120 In just twenty-eight days, BPI lost eighty percent of its 
sales and was forced to close three of its four plants.121 To make matters 
worse, several supermarkets announced that they would stop selling 
LFTB,122 and all but three states participating in the USDA National 
School Lunch Program opted to order ground beef that did not contain 
                                                            
 114. See Rita-Marie Cain Reid, You Say “Lean Finely Textured Beef,” I Say “Pink Slime”, 69 
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Sess.). 
 115. See Josh Sanburn, One Year Later, the Makers of ‘Pink Slime’ are Hanging on, and 
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slime.htm?mediatype=Video (last visited May 2, 2015). 
 118. Sanburn, supra note 115. 
 119. Reid, supra note 114, at 626. See Helena Bottemiller, BPI Sues ABC News, Former USDA 
Officials for ‘Pink Slime’ Defamation, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012), http:// 
www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/09/bpi-sues-abc-news-former-usda-officials-for-pink-slime-
defamation. 
 120. Bettina Elias Siegel, BPI Makes Accusation of Libel in WSJ Ad, Suspends Some Opera-
tions—My Response, THE LUNCH TRAY (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.thelunchtray.com/bpi-makes-
accusation-of-libel-in-wsj-ad-suspends-some-operations-my-response/. 
 121. See Daniel P. Finney, Beef Products Inc. Sues ABC for Defamation Over ‘Pink Slime’, 
DES MOINES REG. (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.public.iastate.edu/~nscentral/mr/12/0914/slime.html. 
 122. See Ryan Jaslow, More Grocery Store Chains Drop “Pink Slime” from Shelves: What 
About Walmart?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-grocery-chains-
drop-pink-slime-from-shelves-what-about-wal-mart/. 
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LFTB.123 In response to consumer demand, Congress introduced the Re-
quiring Easy and Accurate Labeling of Beef Act (REAL Beef Act) in 
March 2012, which would require labeling of beef products containing 
LFTB.124 Although this bill was not enacted into law, in April 2012, the 
“USDA agree[d] to approve requests by ground beef producers who 
wished to label their products containing LFTB.”125 
In September 2012, as a result of this public backlash against their 
product, BPI sued ABC, its on-air personalities, and the USDA employ-
ees featured in the ABC broadcasts in South Dakota state court for statu-
tory and common law product disparagement, defamation, and tortious 
interference.126 BPI contends that the defendants’ false statements im-
plied LFTB was not safe for consumption and/or impugned the safety of 
LFTB.127 BPI alleges that the defendants effectively renamed LFTB in an 
effort “to incite and inflame consumers against BPI and LFTB.”128 The 
defendants’ motion to dismiss is pending.129 
2. Chilling Effect of the Veggie Libel Laws 
Although no plaintiff has yet won a judgment pursuant to a veggie 
libel statute,130 these statutes have the purpose and effect of chilling 
speech.131 The Winfrey, Buckeye Egg, and BPI lawsuits highlight the 
considerable risk and expense at stake in criticizing food production.132 
                                                            
 123. See Finney, supra note 121. The states that continued to order the product for school 
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Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2014). 
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Even if the speaker prevails in court, he or she must still bear the litiga-
tion costs.133 For organizations or individuals without the finances to de-
fend themselves against potential lawsuits, silence may be the most cost-
effective option.134 Consumer advocate Ralph Nader stated: “The realis-
tic objective of the frivolous ‘veggie-libel’ statutes and lawsuits is not 
money . . . . It is to send a chilling message to millions of people that 
they better keep their opinions to themselves.”135 Although only thirteen 
states have enacted veggie libel laws, there is a danger of national impact 
from “runaway liability”136 as Internet users, authors, and national book 
publishers who post statements about food may be subject to litigation in 
any or all of the states with veggie libel laws.137 
The chilling effect of veggie libel laws is not only theoretical.138 
Floyd Abrams, a First Amendment expert, confirmed that many of his 
small media clients fear being sued and “do not want to be part of some 
test case.”139 For example, in 1998, one publisher cancelled a book, 
which had already begun printing, after receiving a letter from Monsan-
to’s attorney saying “he believed the manuscript, which he had not seen, 
included false statements that would disparage” Monsanto’s herbicide, 
Roundup.140 The book’s coauthor stated that the publisher’s lawyer al-
ready had approved the book, but later changed his mind because of con-
cerns about being sued under veggie libel laws.141 Similarly, Alec Bald-
win claims that in the late-1990s, the Discovery Channel denied his pro-
posal for a documentary about “pesticides, herbicides, and some disputed 
practices used to raise beef” because it feared a veggie libel lawsuit.142 In 
addition, people who have been outspoken about food safety issues have 
indicated their reluctance to continue their work.143 For example, one 
Sierra Club volunteer in Ohio worried: “When I give speeches [about 
genetically modified foods (GMOs)] . . . I’m even afraid to say, ‘This 
                                                            
 133. Grey, supra note 132, at 16. 
 134. Id. See also Collins, Veggie Libel, supra note 112. 
 135. Collins, Veggie Libel, supra note 112. 
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 138. See Eileen Gay Jones, Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and Food Safety in the 
Era of Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 823, 858 (2001) (discussing 
many examples of the veggie laws’ chilling effects). 
 139. Melody Petersen, Farmers’ Right to Sue Grows, Raising Debate on Food Safety, N.Y. 
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might be unsafe,’ . . . because I’m fearful I could get sued.”144 The Na-
tional Fisheries Institute also warned activists involved in a campaign to 
protect swordfish of potential veggie libel liability.145 
There is also evidence that the agricultural industry has used the 
laws to threaten critics.146 In 1997, the United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable 
Association demanded that the environmental group Food and Water 
cease its distribution of reports questioning the safety of irradiated fruits 
and vegetables.147 The Association indicated that it would be “closely 
scrutiniz[ing]” Food and Water’s actions in light of veggie libels laws.148 
These are just some of the reported instances of veggie libel laws’ 
chilling effects on free speech. These anecdotes suggest that veggie libel 
laws “are used almost exclusively by the powerful to silence their crit-
ics.”149 They also demonstrate that the laws are achieving their ultimate 
objective of limiting public debate about food safety.150 
III. HOW AG-GAG AND VEGGIE LIBEL WERE RE-TOOLED: AN 
OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LAWS 
The ag-gag and veggie libel laws discussed above were enacted in 
response to shortcomings of existing laws, such as fraud, trespass, defa-
mation, and product disparagement. This Part provides an overview of 
those existing laws, which were re-tooled as ag-gag laws, restricting ac-
cess to information about agricultural operations, and veggie libel laws, 
limiting dissemination of such information. The following discussion 
will illuminate the analysis in Part IV of policy justifications for these 
tailor-made laws. 
A. Ag-Gag: Re-tooling Fraud and Trespass 
As the new generation of ag-gag laws in Iowa, Utah, and Idaho are 
currently written, an undercover agent commits a crime if she enters an 
agricultural operation by “force, threat, misrepresentation or trespass.”151 
As discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.A, proponents of the ag-gag 
laws have asserted the need to protect the agricultural industry against 
fraud and trespass. However, these new crimes created by the ag-gag 
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 145. Jones, supra note 138, at 858. 
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 149. Collins, Veggie Libel, supra note 112. 
 150. See Jones, supra note 138, at 859. 
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laws are redundant because such actions are already punishable under 
existing laws.152 For example, entering property without consent of the 
owner is trespass.153 In addition, the federal Animal Enterprise Terrorism 
Act already criminalizes damage to operations at an agriculture produc-
tion facility.154 As the following discussion demonstrates, the ag-gag 
laws that criminalize the misrepresentation of information to gain en-
trance into an agricultural facility are not actually targeting fraud or tres-
pass. Their true aim is “to limit the scrutiny of the agriculture indus-
try.”155 
Although the laws purport to target “trespass,” case law does not 
support the idea that misrepresenting oneself on an employment applica-
tion to obtain access to a facility constitutes a criminal trespass.156 Gen-
erally, trespass is committed when a person enters upon land of another 
without consent.157 Therefore, consent is a defense to a trespass claim.158 
Courts have recognized that even consent gained by misrepresentation 
may be sufficient.159 Although consent to enter is vitiated “if a wrongful 
act is done in excess of and in abuse of authorized entry,”160 there is no 
case law “suggesting that consent based on a resume misrepresentation 
turns a successful job applicant into a trespasser the moment she enters 
the employer’s premises to begin work.”161 Furthermore, if a court 
“turned successful resume fraud into trespass, [it] would not be protect-
ing the interest underlying the tort of trespass—the ownership and peace-
able possession of land.”162 Therefore, by preventing misrepresentation 
                                                            
 152. Andrew Cohen, The Law That Makes It Illegal to Report on Animal Cruelty, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/the-law-that-
makes-it-illegal-to-report-on-animal-cruelty/284485/. See also Idaho MSJ, supra note 17, at 17. 
 153. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-7008, 18-7011 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 58). 
 154. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2012) (making it a federal crime to intentionally harm the property of 
an animal enterprise). 
 155. Cohen, supra note 152. 
 156. Liebmann, supra note 44, at 586; Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 
505, 517 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 157. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 517. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351–53 (7th Cir. 1995) (ABC agents 
with concealed cameras who obtained consent to enter an ophthalmic clinic by pretending to be 
patients were not trespassers because, among other things, they “entered offices open to anyone”); 
Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“[W]here consent was fraudulently 
induced, but consent was nonetheless given, plaintiff has no claim for trespass.”); Martin v. Fidelity 
& Cas. Co. of N.Y., 421 So. 2d 109, 111 (Ala. 1982) (consent to enter is valid “even though consent 
may have been given under a mistake of facts, or procurred [sic] by fraud” (quoting Alexander v. 
Letson, 242 Ala. 488 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 160. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 517. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
1364 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1345 
on an employment application, the ag-gag laws are not preventing tres-
pass of an agricultural facility.163 
Similarly, the current ag-gag laws do not prevent “fraud.” To pre-
vail on a common law fraud claim, a plaintiff must prove that a misrepre-
sentation or concealment of a material fact was reasonably calculated to 
deceive, was made with the intent to deceive, and succeeded in deceiving 
the victim, who suffered a resulting injury.164 False speech, which may 
be protected under the First Amendment in certain circumstances, will 
constitute fraud, which is not protected speech, only if there is a potential 
for harm.165 As the Supreme Court asserted in analyzing whether a stat-
ute falls under the First Amendment’s fraud exception, “There must be a 
direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be 
prevented.”166 If the harm to be prevented by the ag-gag statutes is the 
impact of eventual publications of undercover videos, then this harm 
lacks proximate cause to the misrepresentation made on an employment 
application.167 Furthermore, existing libel laws could provide a remedy 
against the distribution of videos that are misleading or untruthful.168 
However, if the recordings accurately portray operations at the facility, 
any detrimental effects, such as loss of profits, would stem directly from 
those activities, not from the misrepresentation of the employee on the 
employment application.169 Therefore, because the laws only purport 
to—but do not actually—target fraud, the ag-gag laws are not subject to 
the fraud exception to the First Amendment’s protection of false 
speech.170 Thus, these new laws do not pass constitutional muster.171 
B. Veggie Libel: Re-tooling Defamation and Product Disparagement 
As discussed in Part II.B, veggie libel statutes were passed in re-
sponse to the perceived failing of the common law torts of defamation 
and product disparagement.172 Both torts arise from the defendant pub-
lishing a false, negative statement.173 The difference is that defamation 
                                                            
 163. Liebmann, supra note 44, at 586. 
 164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). See Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d 1, 7 
(Iowa 2012) (stating elements of a fraud claim in Iowa). 
 165. Liebmann, supra note 44, at 580. 
 166. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012). 
 167. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 962–63 (M.D.N.C. 
1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 168. See discussion infra Part VII. 
 169. Liebmann, supra note 44, at 586. 
 170. Id. at 587; see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537. 
 171. See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
 172. Bederman et al., supra note 80, at 135. 
 173. See Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 800 F. Supp. 928, 932–33 (E.D. Wash. 1992). 
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involves a statement that damages the plaintiff’s reputation,174 whereas 
disparagement relates to a statement about the plaintiff’s products or ser-
vices.175 Veggie libel laws more closely resemble the common law cause 
of action for product disparagement.176 Most states have adopted the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts’s approach for product disparagement,177 
which makes the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss178 if 
the plaintiff proves that the defendant: (1) intentionally (2) caused pecu-
niary loss to the plaintiff by (3) falsely stating a fact (4) to a third person, 
(5) knowing that the statement was false or recklessly disregarding its 
truth or falsity.179 “[P]ublication of an injurious falsehood is a legal cause 
of pecuniary loss if . . . it is a substantial factor in bringing about the 
loss . . . .”180 
Because of the high value we place on First Amendment rights, 
common law product disparagement lawsuits are difficult to sustain. A 
plaintiff has to meet the difficult burden of showing that the alleged dis-
paraging statement was false and that its publication caused actual dam-
ages to the plaintiff.181 This standard was fatal to the Washington apple 
growers’ disparagement claims because CBS’s report disclosed the re-
sults of scientific investigations that raised a concern that Alar was harm-
ful.182 The court, in rejecting the suit, reasoned that CBS’s report could 
not properly be construed as disparaging as it was based on scientific 
data.183 “Because a broadcast could be interpreted in numerous, nuanced 
                                                            
 174. A defamatory communication is defined as one that “tends so to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with him.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Under Ohio law, a cause of 
action for defamation consists of: “(1) a false and defamatory statement, (2) about [the] plaintiff, (3) 
published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the 
defendant, and (5) that was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.” Gosden 
v. Louis, 687 N.E.2d 481, 488 (Ohio App. 1996). Libel is written defamation; slander is spoken. Id. 
 175. Such actions usually involve business competitors. 
 176. Product disparagement is also known as “trade libel” and is one form of injurious false-
hood, which also includes disparagement of land, personal property, and intangible things. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. a (1977). 
 177. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 27:99 (4th ed. 2014). 
 178. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633(1) (2011) (“The pecuniary loss for which a 
publisher of injurious falsehood is subject to liability is restricted to (a) the pecuniary loss that results 
directly and immediately from the effect of the conduct of third persons, including impairment of 
vendibility or value caused by disparagement, and (b) the expense of measures reasonably necessary 
to counteract the publication, including litigation to remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value 
by disparagement.”). 
 179. Id. § 623A. 
 180. Id. § 632. 
 181. Bederman et al., supra note 80, at 141. 
 182. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 820–22 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 183. Id. at 822. 
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ways,” the court wrote, “a great deal of uncertainty would arise as to the 
message conveyed by the broadcast.”184 The court recognized that allow-
ing the growers’ suit to go forward would risk chilling journalistic 
speech and make it difficult for reporters to predict when their work will 
subject them to tort liability.185 
Common law defamation is strictly constrained by First Amend-
ment limitations.186 Although the Supreme Court has not decided the ex-
tent to which First Amendment protections apply to product disparage-
ment,187 the Court accepted, without deciding on, a district court’s appli-
cation of the First Amendment’s actual malice requirement for defama-
tion claims by public figures to a disparagement claim.188 Lower federal 
courts and state supreme courts have also applied the First Amendment 
limitations on liability for defamation to disparagement.189 Therefore, a 
plaintiff likely would need to prove actual malice—that the defendant 
knew of the falsity of the statement or had a reckless disregard for its 
truth.190 The difficult burdens faced under the common law were reason 
for the agricultural industry to fashion a new tort—agricultural dispar-
agement.191 
As will be discussed in more detail in Part VI.B, veggie libel laws 
modified the common law tort of product disparagement by relaxing or 
omitting several stringent constitutional requirements established to pro-
tect debate about matters of public concern.192 The laws allow recovery 
                                                            
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–60 (1985); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
269 (1964). See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (the First Amendment’s protec-
tion of speech applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. c (1977) (“In the absence of any 
indications from the Supreme Court on the extent, if any, to which the elements of the tort of injuri-
ous falsehood will be affected by the free-speech and free-press provisions of the First Amendment, 
it is not presently feasible to make predictions with assurance.”). 
 188. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984); Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270–71 (D. Mass. 1981). Actual malice 
means the defendant either knew the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. All other plaintiffs need only prove the defendant was negli-
gent, or worse, whether the statement was true. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. 
 189. See, e.g., Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1133 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (stating the actual malice standard applies to disparagement claims); A & B–Abell Eleva-
tor Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283, 1295 (Ohio 
1995) (requiring plaintiffs to show actual malice in disparagement cases based on statements that are 
qualifiedly privileged under defamation law). 
 190. Bederman et al., supra note 80, at 141. 
 191. Bederman, supra note 11, at 194. 
 192. See infra Part VI.B. 
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of actual and punitive damages for the dissemination of “false infor-
mation” not based upon “reliable” scientific facts and data “which the 
disseminator knows or should have known to be false, and which casts 
doubt upon the safety of any perishable agricultural food product.”193 
Therefore, the laws that make a speaker liable for disseminating infor-
mation she “knew or should have known” was false, replace the tradi-
tional malice standard with the lower negligence standard.194 Many of the 
laws also lack a provision that the false statement be “of and concerning” 
a particular plaintiff’s product, which can result in potentially limitless 
liability, thereby stifling public debate.195 
IV. PURPOSES OF THE ACTS: JUSTIFYING SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR THE 
AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY 
The previous Part discussed the shortcomings of common law 
causes of action to protect against undercover investigations and com-
mentary on agricultural products that allegedly wreak havoc on the mar-
ket. The agricultural industry has successfully convinced legislatures to 
enact tailor-made torts and crimes to protect its unique interests.196 Such 
special protection conferred to the agricultural industry begs the question 
of whether ag-gag and veggie libel laws are warranted. As the Washing-
ton Post editorial board stated, the public should question “why an indus-
try that claims it has nothing to hide demands protections afforded to no 
other.”197 In general, the agricultural industry argues that such laws are 
justified due to the extreme volatility of food markets.198 When consum-
ers become disgusted by or afraid of their food, the thinking goes, corpo-
rate profits can plummet more precipitously than with any other product 
or resource in the marketplace. Ag-gag and veggie libel laws are de-
signed to enforce calm in the market and to ensure a steady stream of 
profits by quelling critical speech and activists’ exposés. This Part ex-
plores the agricultural industry’s justification for each of its tailor-made 
laws. 
                                                            
 193. Letter from Margaret R. Hughes, Deputy Attorney General of Idaho, to the Honorable 
Herb Carlson, regarding House Bill 593: Product Disparagement (Feb. 28, 1992) (on file with the 
Center for Science in the Public Interest), available at http://www.cspinet.org/foodspeak/laws/idago. 
htm. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Editorial, Cruelty To Farm Animals Demands Exposure, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cruelty-to-farm-animals-demands-exposure/2013/04/26/ 
9a972c8e-a6bf-11e2-a8e2-5b98cb59187f_story.html. 
 198. Grey, supra note 132, at 15. 
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A. Ag-Gag: Protecting Agricultural Operations 
Supporters of ag-gag laws argue that the legislation is necessary to 
protect agricultural producers from media persecution, dangerous activ-
ists, and harm to their property and livelihood. Bill Meierling, spokes-
man for the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), drafted a 
model ag-gag law199 and explained, “At the end of the day it’s about per-
sonal property rights or the individual right to privacy.”200 State Senator 
and veterinarian Joe Seng, who sponsored Iowa’s Senate bill, stated that 
that law’s intent was to protect the agricultural industry against “subver-
sive acts” that could “bring down the industry.”201 Iowa Governor Terry 
Branstad argued, “[F]armers should not be subjected to people doing il-
legal, inappropriate things and being involved in fraud and deception in 
order to try to disrupt agricultural operations.”202 
Supporters of the ag-gag laws also imply that the laws protect the 
public interest by protecting the animals at the agricultural facilities from 
exposure to disease and other problems that may arise from unauthorized 
access to agricultural production facilities.203 A representative of the 
Utah Farm Bureau stated that undercover farm investigations “have done 
more of a disservice than anything positive.”204 
Many proponents of the law indicated the law’s focus was on ani-
mal activists. For example, Iowa Senator Joe Seng stated that the law’s 
goal is to protect agriculture from “extremist vegans.”205 Utah State Rep-
resentative John Mathis voiced similar concerns, stating that the laws are 
needed because “national propaganda groups” are using the footage from 
undercover investigations “as part of their larger agenda of shutting 
                                                            
 199. See Will Potter, “Ag Gag” Bills and Supporters Have Close Ties to ALEC, GREEN IS THE 
NEW RED (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/ag-gag-american-legislative-
exchange-council/5947. 
 200. Associated Press, State Bills Seek End to Farm Animal Abuse Videos, FOX NEWS (Mar. 
17, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/17/state-bills-seek-end-to-farm-animal-abuse-
videos/#ixzz2Qn96AWvl. 
 201. “Ag Gag” Bill Passes Iowa Legislature, IOWA PUB. TELEVISION (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.iptv.org/mtom/story.cfm/feature/9179/mtom_20120302_3727_feature. 
 202. See Ken Anderson, ‘Ag Facility Fraud’ Is Now Illegal in Iowa, BROWNFIELD AG NEWS 
(Mar. 6, 2012), http://brownfieldagnews.com/2012/03/06/ag-facility-fraud-is-now-illegal-in-iowa/. 
 203. Protecting Agricultural Producers from Fraud, IOWA SENATE DEMOCRATS (Mar. 2, 
2012), http://www.senate.iowa.gov/democrats/protecting-agricultural-producers-from-fraud/; see 
Kai Ryssdal, Iowa’s “Ag Gag” Sponsor Defends Bill, MARKETPLACE FOR AM. PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 1, 
2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/life/iowas-ag-gag-sponsor-defends-bill. 
 204. Complaint at 19, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-CV-00679 (D. Utah July 
22, 2013), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter Utah Complaint]. 
 205. Iowa Approves First Ag Protection Law, NAT’L HOG FARMER (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://nationalhogfarmer.com/business/iowa-approves-first-ag-protection-law. 
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down the operations.”206 Mike Kohler, speaking on behalf of dairy farm-
ers, spoke in support of Utah’s law, explaining that it “will be a good tool 
to . . . stop some of the conduct nationally that has been causing a prob-
lem” for the industry.207 In Utah, State Senator David Hinkins described 
the ag-gag law as “a trespassing bill,” intended to prevent people from 
entering an agricultural operation “who have no reason to be there except 
espionage, to spy on the operation.”208 He also explained that the law is 
targeted at “the vegetarian people,” who are “trying to kill the animal 
industry.”209 
According to the Animal Agriculture Alliance (AAA), ag-gag bills 
are “farm protection legislation”210 necessary to hold activists “accounta-
ble for their actions to undermine farmers, ranchers and meat processors 
through use of videos depicting alleged mistreatment of animals for the 
purposes of gaining media attention and fundraising—all in an effort to 
drive their vegan agenda.”211 The AAA further alleges that videos re-
leased from undercover investigations are “highly edited” and “attempt 
to use emotional images and scare tactics to discourage Americans from 
eating meat, milk[,] and eggs because they do not believe that we have 
that right.”212 This view is held by other ag-gag supporters. Senator Jim 
Rice, a sponsor of the Idaho Senate bill “has been very vocal in express-
ing his opinion that Mercy For Animals orchestrated the video on the 
Idaho dairy operation.” 213 Other ag-gag supporters have claimed that the 
videos released are heavily edited and, in some instances, it is actually 
the undercover investigators contributing to the animal abuse captured on 
film.214 Therefore, supporters argue that ag-gag laws are intended to stifle 
                                                            
 206. Josh Loftin, Filming on Farms Could Be Banned in Utah, FOOD MANUFACTURING (Feb. 
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 207. Utah Complaint, supra note 204, at 20. 
 208. Marjorie Cortez, Bill on Interfering with Agricultural Operations Gets Preliminary Nod in 
Senate, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://politicalnotebook.blogs.deseretnews.com/2012/03/06/ 
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 209. Id. 
 210. Debate: After Activists Covertly Expose Animal Cruelty, Should They Be Targeted with 
“Ag-Gag” Laws?, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/ 
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 212. Animal Agric. Alliance, Deceptive Videos Unfairly Attack Farmers, FARMS.COM (Dec. 
15, 2010), http://www.farms.com/farmspages/commentary/detailedcommentary/tabid/192/default. 
aspx?newsid=36655. 
 213. 2014 Idaho Legislative Update, supra note 29. 
 214. See Amanda Radke, Do You Support Ag Gag Laws?, BEEF DAILY (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://beefmagazine.com/blog/do-you-support-ag-gag-laws (“I also know that PETA and HSUS 
supporters are usually behind these terrible videos depicting animal abuse. And, if they aren’t behind 
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these allegedly misleading and damaging investigations, limiting the 
likelihood that such films are made and distributed. 
Based on these statements from ag-gag sponsors and supporters, the 
goals behind the ag-gag laws are intended to protect property from tres-
pass, prevent any disruptions to the facility as a result of unauthorized 
access, and to protect the agricultural industry from the reputational harm 
caused by the allegedly misleading videos produced by undercover in-
vestigations.215 As discussed in Part III, these interests are already pro-
tected by trespass, fraud, and defamation causes of action.216 However, 
these statements also clearly reflect a desire to achieve what cannot be 
accomplished by existing law—the stifling of efforts by animal rights 
groups to expose industry practices through undercover investigations.217 
In other words, the agricultural industry is protecting its interests by sti-
fling protected free speech about how food is produced. 
B. Veggie Libel: Protecting Agricultural Economy 
The stated legislative purpose of disparagement statutes is virtually 
identical in all thirteen states. The language used reflects a protectionist 
concern for the agricultural and aquacultural industries because “agricul-
ture . . . [is] significant [to] . . . the state economy.”218 This concern is 
used to justify the creation of a cause of action to protect producers from 
disparaging statements or dissemination of false information about the 
safety of the consumption of food products.219 The Texas and North Da-
kota statutes do not expressly state their purpose.220 However, supporters 
of the Texas laws explained that the law was necessary because, under 
                                                                                                                                     
the camera catching the action, they are usually the ones initiating the abuse. And, these organiza-
tions strategically release these videos to wreak havoc on the agriculture industry, which usually 
results in litigation, loss of jobs and a direct shot at the markets.”). See also Bittman, supra note 30. 
 215. See Liebmann, supra note 44, at 586. 
 216. See supra Part III. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-620 (Westlaw through 2015 Act 2015–16). 
 219. In eight of the thirteen statutes, the purpose is repeated nearly verbatim: “[T]o pro-
tect . . . the agricultural and aquacultural economy . . . by providing a cause of action for producers 
to recover damages for the disparagement of any perishable product or commodity.” Id.; see also 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(A) (Westlaw through 2015 First Regular Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-16-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Acts 2–8, 10); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4501 (Westlaw 
through 2014 Regular Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-251 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. 
Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 File 1); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 20-10A-2 (Westlaw through 2014 Regular Sess.). Two states limit the purpose to the protec-
tion of agricultural products. IDAHO CODE § 6-2001 (West, Westlaw through 2015 ch. 58); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 5-100–02 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Sess.). 
 220. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 96.001–004 (West, Westlaw 2013 Third Called 
Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-44-01 to -04 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.). 
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traditional product disparagement law, “it can be difficult to recover 
damages for disparaged crops that have not been harvested.”221 The 
house bill committee report noted that food producers in Texas are vul-
nerable to the malicious use of false or misleading information especially 
“considering the short amount of time available to harvest and market 
perishable agricultural . . . food products.”222 Ohio’s food disparagement 
statute also indicates a concern for “the welfare of the consuming pub-
lic.”223 It states that its veggie libel law will “benefit all the citizens of 
this state”224 who could be threatened by “false information about the 
safety of Ohio’s food supply.”225 
Although the lawsuits involving apples, beef, and LFTB226 evidence 
the actual damage that can result from communications about food pro-
duction, it is unclear why special statutory protection is denied to other 
industries whose economic welfare could similarly be severely harmed 
by disparaging statements affecting nonagricultural products.227 The jus-
tification for agriculture’s special status is tenuous. If impact on the 
economy is the test for whether to pass protectionist legislation, the safe-
ty of other commercial products, such as automobiles or fuel, could be 
shielded from public scrutiny and debate.228 The law of product dispar-
agement already protects manufacturers from false statements that dam-
age the reputation of a product.229 However, similar to ag-gag laws, “[i]t 
cannot seriously be doubted that the food disparagement statutes are de-
signed to snuff out debate on the important public issue of food safe-
ty.”230 As stated by a representative of the American Feed Industry Asso-
ciation: “I think that to the degree that the mere presence of these laws 
has caused activists to think twice, then these laws have already accom-
                                                            
 221. Kevin A. Isern, When Is Speech No Longer Protected by the First Amendment: A Plain-
tiff’s Perspective of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 233, 252 (1998) (quot-
ing House Research Organization, Bill Analysis of CSHB 722, at 17). 
 222. Id. (quoting Full History - HB 722, Bill Analysis, Committee Report). 
 223. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 File 1). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Prior to defendants’ news broadcasting, BPI sold nearly five million pounds of LFTB per 
week, ran four processing facilities, and had over 1,300 employees. Reid, supra note 114, at 636. 
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 228. Jones, supra note 138, at 846. 
 229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. a (1977). 
 230. Bruce E.H. Johnson & Eric M. Stahl, Food Disparagement Laws: An Overview of the 
Constitutional Issues, LIBEL DEF. RES. CTR. BULLETIN: AGRIC. DISPARAGEMENT LAWS 31, 31 
(1998). 
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plished what we set out to do.”231 As discussed in Part VI, such laws that 
make critics and advocates “think twice” before speaking out on matters 
of public concern, such as food safety, violate the First Amendment.232 
C. Special Protection for the Agricultural Industry Is Unwarranted 
Supporters of ag-gag and veggie libel laws tout the importance of 
the agricultural industry to the state to justify the need for protections 
against that which threatens the economy. Proponents of veggie libel 
laws argue that even if they could afford to counter negative reports 
about agricultural products, it may either be too late or unhelpful given 
the public’s lack of understanding about science.233 Similarly, ag-gag 
supporters argue that farming practices may seem unsavory or offensive 
to consumers who are not educated enough to understand generally ac-
cepted husbandry animal practices.234 However, these arguments cannot 
justify the restrictions on speech posed by the ag-gag and veggie libel 
laws. Public discourse about controversial issues is important to a free 
market economy, regardless of the economic ramifications.235 Although 
the public interest is cited as a purpose for each of the laws, by limiting 
the amount and type of information the public can receive about food and 
food safety, the laws have the opposite effect.236 
V. CONSUMER DEMAND FOR FOOD SYSTEM TRANSPARENCY 
Undercover investigations and public information campaigns re-
vealing food safety scandals, animal abuse, and the effects of eating pro-
cessed foods have contributed to consumers’ demand for “truth, trust, 
and transparency in their food.”237 Upon learning how their food is pro-
duced, consumers are seeking even more information about their food 
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COMMC’NS, THREE-QUARTERS OF AMERICANS SAY SUSTAINABILITY IS A PRIORITY WHEN MAKING 
FOOD PURCHASING DECISIONS, ACCORDING TO NEW CONE COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH (Mar. 13, 
2014), available at http://www.conecomm.com/stuff/contentmgr/files/0/a8d3e04edc7ff 
ebee79eda7100e765f0/files/2014_cone_communications_food_issues_trend_tracker_press_release_
and_fact_sheet__.pdf (discussing a 2014 study finding that seventy-four percent of consumers want 
companies to explain how their food purchasing decisions impact the environment). 
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and are looking to change the system that produces it.238 According to 
Phil Lambert, known as the “Supermarket Guru,” 
More shoppers are interested in knowing not only where their foods 
are coming from, but also want to know about the people making 
their foods and are learning about their stories. . . . Shoppers are 
spending the time and reading more food packages as they shop the 
aisles in the supermarkets. . . . Food transparency is here to stay.239 
Research commissioned by the food industry confirms that con-
sumers are demanding more transparency at every level of food produc-
tion. A 2013 consumer study conducted by the Center for Food Integrity 
(CFI) Food System240 reveals the public’s distrust of “big food.”241 As 
the CFI research demonstrated, consumers do not believe that today’s 
food system is transparent.242 Furthermore, consumers believe that large 
companies are likely to put profit ahead of public interest.243 Similarly, in 
the Transparency and Consumer Trust Survey, conducted by the U.S. 
Farmers and Ranchers Alliance (USFRA), when consumers were asked 
the level of trust they had in the food industry to “protect their health,” 
responses indicated that twenty-eight percent of consumers trusted the 
food regulatory organizations, twenty-nine percent trusted farmers and 
ranchers, and eleven percent trusted food packagers and manufactur-
                                                            
 238. See Dragich, supra note 1, at 402–03, 405 (using, as an example, how consumer anger 
prompted industry action in a controversy involving the use of Bisphenol A (BPA), an endocrine-
disrupting chemical, in food containers, baby bottles, and cups). See also Michele Simon, BPA Is 
FDA’s Latest Gift to Food Industry, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/04/bpa-is-fdas-latest-gift-to-food-industry. In response to 
reports linking BPA to cancer and other diseases, consumers stopped purchasing baby products 
containing BPA. Id. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) subsequently petitioned the FDA to 
ban the use of BPA in baby products. Gretchen Goetz, BPA Banned from Baby Bottles, Sippy Cups, 
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 18, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/07/bpa-banned-from-
baby-bottles-sippy-cups. The FDA implemented the ban “not because BPA is unsafe when used in 
these products, but because the substance simply isn’t ‘used’ in [baby bottles or cups] anymore.” Id. 
 239. Phil Lempert, The Lempert Report: Top Ten Food Trends 2013 (Trends #6–10), 
SUPERMARKET GURU (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.supermarketguru.com/articles/top-ten-food-
trends-2013-%28trends-6-10%29.html. 
 240. See Overview, CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, http://www.foodintegrity.org/membership 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 241. CTR. FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, 2013 CONSUMER TRUST IN THE FOOD SYSTEM RESEARCH 8–
11 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 CONSUMER TRUST]. 
 242. See Consumer Trust Research 2013: Seven Steps to Trust-Building Transparency and 
Defining Social Outrage & Video: Consumers Weigh In: “Is the Food System Transparent?”, 
CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.foodintegrity.org/research. 
 243. 2013 CONSUMER TRUST, supra note 241, at 8. 
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ers.244 The USFRA survey also found that nearly sixty percent of con-
sumers think it is “extremely important” for grocery stores and restau-
rants to provide information about how their food is produced.245 
While the term “transparency” has become a rallying cry for Amer-
icans demanding that large-scale agriculture “draw back the curtain” on 
its food production practices,246 the term is rarely defined in the popular 
discourse.247 According to the authors of a European Commission study 
of transparency in the food chain, the goal of transparency is to allow 
“informed decisions” on an objective basis.248 Transparency is being 
reached if all stakeholders in the food system (consumers, policymakers, 
and enterprises that provide food)249 understand the relevant aspects of 
products, production, and processes, allowing them to make informed 
decisions.250 Defining transparency in this way illuminates the discussion 
of how and why ag-gag and veggie libel laws are contrary to the public 
interest. 
                                                            
 244. Liz Koehler, Survey Shows Transparency Is Important to Consumers, FARM WEEK NOW 
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://farmweeknow.com/story-survey-shows-transparency-important-consumers-0-
101157. 
 245. Id.; see also The Food Dialogues: Chicago. Integrity in Food Marketing 2014, U.S. 
FARMERS & RANCHERS ALLIANCE, http://www.fooddialogues.com/events/fd-chicago (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2015). 
 246. See Nancy Huehnergarth, Big Food and Big Ag Thwart Your “Right to Know” Anything 
About Your Food, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/09/ 
big-food-and-big-ag-thwart-your-right-to-know-anything-about-your-food/#.VNJdR53F8_Z. For 
example, consumers overwhelmingly favor labeling of genetically engineered food products. Ethan 
A. Huff, MSNBC Poll: Nearly Everyone Supports Mandatory GMO Labeling, NATURALNEWS (Mar. 
3, 2011), http://www.naturalnews.com/z031569_GMO_GMOS_food.html (noting that nearly ninety 
percent of respondents to an MSNBC poll favored labeling, ninety-three percent of respondents in an 
ABC poll favored mandatory labeling, and eighty-seven percent of respondents in a CBS/New York 
Times poll supported GMO labeling). See also Dragich, supra note 1, at 405. 
 247. “Everybody knows what transparency is, until asked to give a definition. Then it seems 
nobody knows.” European Comm’n, Transparency, TRANSPARENT FOOD, http://www.transparent 
food.eu/transparency.html, (quoting RICHARD OLIVER, SATISFACTION: A BEHAVIORAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE CUSTOMER (1997)). 
 248. See GERHARD SCHIEFER & JIVKA DEITERS, TRANSPARENCY IN THE FOOD CHAIN (2013), 
available at http://www.transparentfood.eu/data/TFBookDeliv_TransparencyFoodChain_22July 
2013.pdf. 
 249. Id. at 22. 
 250. Id. at 22, 24. 
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VI. LEGAL TOOLS TO PROTECT BIG-AG: CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
TO THE LAWS 
A. The (Un)Constitutionality of Ag-Gag Lawsuits 
Because the statutory schemes of ag-gag laws vary,251 some such 
laws, enacted or proposed, could withstand a constitutional challenge.252 
However, the majority of newly enacted statutes are likely unconstitu-
tional because they criminalize all employment-based undercover inves-
tigations and investigative journalism, whistleblowing by employees, or 
other expository efforts that entail images or sounds.253 The constitution-
ality of agriculture protection acts in Utah and Idaho has been challenged 
in pending lawsuits brought by animal protection, civil liberties, and con-
sumer advocacy groups, activists, and journalists.254 
In an Idaho suit challenging the constitutionality of that state’s ag-
gag law, Judge B. Lynn Winmill allowed the plaintiffs’ case to proceed 
because the law “is a content-based restriction” to which strict scrutiny 
applies.255 This type of restriction occurs “if either the underlying pur-
                                                            
 251. See discussion supra Part II. 
 252. See generally Jessalee Landfried, Note, Bound & Gagged: Potential First Amendment 
Challenges to “Ag-Gag” Laws, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 377 (2013) (summarizing potential 
First Amendment challenges to ag-gag laws). 
 253. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 14, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104 (D. Idaho 
Mar. 16, 2014). See generally United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (holding federal statute 
criminalizing the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty to be sub-
stantially overbroad); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“Audio and audiovisual recording are media of expression commonly used for the preservation and 
dissemination of information and ideas and thus are ‘included within the free speech and free press 
guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” (quoting Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 
(1952))); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the “First 
Amendment right to film matters of public interest”). 
 254. The other plaintiffs include nonprofit organizations People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Center for Food Safety, Farm Sanctuary, River’s 
Wish Animal Sanctuary, Western Watersheds Project, Sandpoint Vegetarians, Idaho Concerned 
Area Residents for the Environment, Idaho Hispanic Caucus Institute for Research & Education, and 
Farm Forward; the news journal CounterPunch; author and journalist Will Potter; animal agriculture 
scholar and historian James McWilliams; investigator Monte Hickman; freelance journalist Blair 
Koch; and agricultural investigations expert Daniel Hauff. Utah Complaint, supra note 204; Com-
plaint, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104 (D. Idaho Mar 16, 2014). In response to 
the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Idaho law, the Idaho Dairymen’s Association 
stated: “Frankly, we see the expedient nature in which their suit was filed as a compliment to the 
security this new law grants Idaho agricultural producers.” 2014 Idaho Legislative Update, supra 
note 29. Both lawsuits have survived motions to dismiss. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, Dock-
et No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS, doc. 53, (D. Utah Aug. 8, 2014). The plaintiffs in Idaho have filed a 
motion for summary judgment. Idaho MSJ, supra note 17. 
 255. Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction at 23–24, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 
Otter, No. 1:14-cv-00104 (D. Idaho Sept. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Idaho Order]. See Liebmann, supra 
note 44, at 594 (analyzing the impact of United States v. Alvarez on ag-gag laws and explaining why 
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pose of the regulation is to suppress particular ideas or if the regulation, 
by its very terms, singles out particular content for differential treat-
ment.”256 Judge Winmill explained that the Idaho ag-gag statute is con-
tent-based because it “targets one type of speech—speech concerning 
‘the conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operations’”—but 
leaves unburdened other types of speech at an agricultural production 
facility.257 
Similarly, the court ruling in a case challenging Utah’s ag-gag stat-
ute declared that the statute “limits the production and distribution of 
politically salient speech regarding industrial agriculture”258 by prohibit-
ing the recording of activities at agricultural operations.259 The plaintiffs 
successfully argued that by silencing animal activists and journalists, the 
law makes available “[o]nly one side of the debate regarding food safety, 
animal welfare, and labor practices”260—that is, the perspective of the 
industrial agriculture industry. Accordingly, these ag-gag laws target cer-
tain speech, including the particular speakers’ videos critical of animal 
agriculture, and are both content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory.261 
As evidenced by the intent of the bills’ sponsors, the purposes of the laws 
are to prevent harms such as lost profits, lost goodwill, and economic 
disruption that arise from undercover videos with critical viewpoints.262 
                                                                                                                                     
“Ag-Gag laws are not in fact statutes targeting fraud, and therefore do not fall within the exceptions 
requiring a lesser level of scrutiny.”). 
 256. Idaho Order, supra note 255, at 23 (quoting Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 
1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (“As a general rule, laws that by their terms 
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are 
content based.”). See also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (noting that content-based restrictions on speech may distort the market-
place and drive ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace). 
 257. Idaho Order, supra note 255, at 22 (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 ch. 58)). For example: “An employee who films, without the owner’s con-
sent, animals being abused on a farm may be prosecuted and fined for violating section 18-7042; but 
an employee who films, without consent, the farm owner’s children (presuming the children are only 
visiting the facility and not working), may not.” Idaho Order, supra note 255, at 23. 
 258. Utah Complaint, supra note 204, at 5. 
 259. Id. at 36. 
 260. Id. at 5. Plaintiff argued that the Utah Department of Agriculture, through its website 
video series, speaks one-sidedly in support of industrial agriculture, for example, by depicting the 
egg industry as safe and humane. Id. at 23–29 (discussing content on the website touting the benefits 
of industrial agriculture). Therefore, “[f]or the government to speak in favor of one side of an issue 
of significant public concern, while at the same time passing legislation to silence the other side of 
the debate, violates the core principles that animate the First Amendment.” Id. at 29. 
 261. See Idaho MSJ, supra note 17, at 10. 
 262. Bollard, supra note 50, at 10972. For example, sponsors and supporters of Idaho’s law 
expressed an overriding concern about the ability of investigators and whistleblowers to “publicly 
crucify a company” in the media. Idaho MSJ, supra note 17, at 13. 
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Under strict scrutiny of speech-restricting laws, the government 
must prove that a law “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest.”263 As the Court has recently explained: 
“That is a demanding standard. ‘It is rare that a regulation restricting 
speech because of its content will ever be permissible.’”264 
1. Ag-Gag Laws Do Not Serve a Compelling State Interest 
Courts have stated that a compelling interest is one of the “highest 
order.”265 Notwithstanding any “legitimate, or reasonable, or even 
praiseworthy” goals of the law, “[t]here must be some pressing public 
necessity, some essential value that has to be preserved; and even then 
the law must restrict as little speech as possible to serve the goal.”266 
Shielding agricultural production facilities from the impact of undercover 
investigations does not meet this test.267 Rather, most compelling is the 
public’s interest in receiving information discovered by these investiga-
tions. Ag-gag laws, which reduce transparency of agricultural produc-
tion, are contrary to public interest because of the detrimental effects that 
unsafe agricultural practices have on public health.268 
The importance of undercover investigations and whistleblowers to 
monitoring food safety and other issues has been widely recognized.269 
As the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee has stated: 
“Regulators, humane societies, and labor unions rely on whistleblowers 
and legitimate undercover investigations to police conditions at food and 
fiber processing facilities and determine compliance with animal welfare 
and labor laws.”270 Thus, as ag-gag laws criminalize undercover investi-
gations, the public must rely only on government inspections and whis-
tleblowing by non-undercover employees to discover animal cruelty and 
                                                            
 263. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 (U.S. 449, 464 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 264. Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (quoting United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)). 
 265. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 266. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994). 
 267. Liebmann, supra note 44, at 590. 
 268. Id. at 591. 
 269. See id. (arguing that whistleblower protection laws, such as 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(13) 
(2012), demonstrate that “[i]nsulating agricultural production facilities from outside scrutiny is not a 
compelling governmental interest”). 
 270. Bollard, supra note 50, at 10962 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-498(II), at 4 (1992), as re-
printed in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816). 
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food safety issues.271 Considerable evidence proves the ineffectiveness of 
these methods.272 Preventing the public from obtaining this information 
precludes the dissemination of much needed safety-related information; 
this cannot be a compelling state interest. 
When federal agencies fail to fulfill their responsibilities,273 private 
undercover investigations like those banned by ag-gag laws can be the 
only way to expose food safety violations.274 For example, in 2007, an 
investigator for the Humane Society of the United States documented 
“egregious” violations of federal regulations at the Westland/Hallmark 
Meat Company slaughtering plant based in Chino, California.275 The in-
vestigator filmed downer cows, which are too weak or sick to stand on 
their own, being pushed with heavy machinery, electrically shocked, and 
finally dragged to slaughter.276 Two days after the release of the video, 
the plant voluntarily suspended operations.277 Three days later, the 
USDA officially suspended inspections of the plant, forcing a complete 
halt of production.278 This egregious event also resulted in the recall of 
143 million pounds of beef—the largest beef recall in U.S. history.279 
Alarmingly, the USDA had inspectors present at the slaughtering 
plant “continuously,” allowing the plant to pass “17 separate food safety 
and humane handling audits in 2007.”280 Two of these audits occurred 
                                                            
 271. See Protect Animals From Corporate Greed, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, 
http://protectyourfood.org/the-law/ (last visited May 3, 2015) (“Under the guise of property rights, 
ag gag bills are intended to prevent consumers from ever seeing the horrors of animal abuse, con-
taminated crops, illegal working conditions, and risky food safety practices—the sort that result in 
massive food safety recalls and all too frequently lead to outbreaks of food-borne illness.”) [herein-
after ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND]. 
 272. Larissa Wilson, Ag-Gag Laws: A Shift in the Wrong Direction for Animal Welfare on 
Farms, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 311, 329 (2014). 
 273. See Dragich, supra note 1, at 423 (“[T]he FDA and the USDA responses to significant 
food production controversies have often been delay, inaction, and avoidance of regulatory responsi-
bility.”). 
 274. See Paige M. Tomaselli, “Ag-Gag” Laws: Why Animal Welfare is a Food Safety Concern, 
CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/blog/3049/ag-gag-
laws-why-animal-welfare-is-a-food-safety-concern. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT: EVALUATION OF 
FSIS MANAGEMENT CONTROLS OVER PRE-SLAUGHTER ACTICITIES, at i (2008), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/24601-07-KC.pdf. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Andrew Martin, Largest Recall of Ground Beef Is Ordered, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/business/18recall.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1303404634-
53bv9+eAwR0szsFZUDf0zA&_r=0. 
 280. MICHAEL MCFADDEN, A FARM FORWARD REPORT: EXPOSING AG-GAG 2 (2012), availa-
ble at http://farmforward.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Ag-Gag-White-Paper.pdf (stating “the 
USDA has called [downer cattle] ‘unfit for human food’”). 
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“during or very shortly after” the undercover video was recorded.281 One 
of the audit reports, dated February 1, 2008, states: 
I have reviewed the records and programs you have at your plant 
[which] are the best I have ever seen in any plant. . . . Your plant 
has passed numerous audits on humane handling of animals in this 
plant in the year of 2007 and has no failures, which you should to be 
[sic] very proud of.282 
Recent criticism of the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) mismanagement is mounting.283 In a July 2014 letter sent to 
USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack, Food & Water Watch detailed examples 
of meat and poultry plants not receiving food safety inspections because 
of shortages in inspection personnel.284 The FSIS policy beginning in 
2012 to hire “temporary inspectors” and freeze the hiring of permanent 
inspectors caused a large number of vacancies, putting a strain on the 
agency’s ability to meet its statutory and regulatory responsibilities of 
inspecting every meat and poultry plant in America.285 As a result, since 
2012, there have been fifteen recalls of products that were not inspect-
ed.286 
In February 2015, four USDA meat inspectors provided affidavits 
to the whistleblower protection organization Government Accountability 
Project to criticize the USDA’s policy.287 As one inspector stated, the 
production lines under the pilot program, which moved more than twenty 
percent more rapidly than a standard plant, were “running so fast it is 
                                                            
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T OFFICE OF ACCOUNTABILITY, USDA NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS 
APPROACH TO PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH FROM PATHOGENS IN POULTRY PRODUCTS, GAO-14-
744 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-744 (recommending that USDA 
develop additional performance measures for Salmonella and Campylobacter contamination 
in poultry products and ensure future guidelines for controlling Salmonella and Campylobacter on 
farms). 
 284. Jeremy Gerrard, Consumer Rights Group Says Inadequate USDA Inspection Leaves Con-
sumers At Risk, FOOD ENGINEERING (July 16, 2014), http://www.foodengineeringmag.com/articles/ 
92524-consumer-rights-group-says-inadequate-usda-inspection-leaves-consumers-at-risk. See also 
Letter from Food & Water Watch to Tom Vilsack, USDA Sec’y (July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Letter 
from Food & Water Watch], available at http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Vilsack_ 
letter_July_2014.pdf#_ga=1.57129068.715828342.1400295150. 
 285. Letter from Food & Water Watch, supra note 284, at 1. 
 286. Id. 
 287. See WTF Hormel?!, FOOD INTEGRITY CAMPAIGN, http://www.foodwhistleblower.org/ 
campaign/hormel-hogs (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
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impossible to see anything on the carcass.”288 Another inspector went 
further, stating, “I can say without a doubt that this plant is not meeting 
and certainly is not exceeding [the USDA’s standards for food safety and 
quality]. . . . The only way this plant could possibly be meeting these 
standards is by manipulating employees, USDA inspectors, and their 
own records and processes. I have personally witnessed all three.”289 
Although these whistleblowers are legitimate employees, and are 
thus not subject to ag-gag laws, relying solely on such employees to re-
port violations of safety or animal welfare standards is ineffective.290 
Whistleblowers often face harassment and other adverse employment 
consequences.291 Such concerns are particularly great among the majority 
of farmworkers who are not authorized to work in the United States.292 
The broad implications of ag-gag laws are illustrated by a hypothetical 
example presented by Amanda Hitt of the Government Accountability 
Project: a low-wage factory employee whose only intent in applying for 
work there was to earn a living, but who nonetheless discovers inhumane 
animal-handling situations that the employee feels compelled to record 
and report.293 Hitt asks: how can that employee prove that he did not ob-
tain employment with the intent to record and report the factory’s opera-
tion?294 
The American public cannot rely solely on government inspections 
or legitimate employee whistleblowers to enforce anticruelty and food 
safety laws.295 Restrictions or prohibitions on undercover investigations 
decrease opportunities for the public to learn of food safety violations, 
thereby increasing the risk that consumers contract illnesses from the 
                                                            
 288. Ted Genoways, Whistleblower USDA Food Inspectors on Hormel’s Pork Plants: It’s 
“Just Nuts”, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120982/hormels-
usda-food-inspector-scandal-reveals-lax-conditions. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Wilson, supra note 272, at 329. 
 291. A 1999 survey of approximately 800 whistleblowers in the United States found that sixty-
nine percent of them were criticized or avoided by coworkers. Kim R. Sawyer, Jackie Johnson & 
Mark Holub, The Necessary Illegitimacy of the Whistleblower 4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917316. 
 292. See DANIEL CARROLL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A DEMOGRAPHIC AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROFILE OF UNITED STATES FARM WORKERS 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf. 
 293. Kristen Rasmussen, Efforts to Restrict Recordings of Animal Abuse Could Impede News-
gathering, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 2012, at 4, available at http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-
law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-spring-2012/efforts-restrict-recordings#sthash. 
ChLbC1uV.dpuf 
 294. Id. 
 295. See Bittman, supra note 30 (“[O]rganizations . . . need to be allowed to do the work that 
the federal and state governments are not: documenting the kind of behavior most of us abhor. In-
deed, the independent investigators should be supported.”). 
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consumption of unsafe food products.296 Therefore, preventing the public 
from receiving information obtained from undercover investigations 
cannot be a compelling government interest. 
2. Ag-Gag Laws Are Not Narrowly Tailored 
A content-based speech restriction must be “the least restrictive 
means among available, effective alternatives.”297 To satisfy the narrow 
tailoring requirement, “the Government . . . bears the burden of showing 
that the remedy it has adopted does not ‘burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate inter-
ests.’”298 Yet ag-gag laws are not narrowly tailored to address the harm 
that the government seeks to address.299 Alternative means exist by 
which to accomplish the goal of protecting the reputation of agricultural 
production facilities that do not involve restrictions on speech.300 In 
United States v. Alvarez,301 in which the Supreme Court held that the Sto-
len Valor Act, which made it a crime to lie about receiving the Congres-
sional Medal of Honor, was unconstitutional, the Court found that the 
government had not shown why “counterspeech” was insufficient to 
combat the harms that the statute at issue sought to address.302 In recog-
nizing this, the Court declared: “The remedy for speech that is false is 
speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The re-
sponse to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlight-
ened; to the straightout lie, the simple truth.”303 Therefore, when a harm 
can be mitigated by greater transparency, more speech is the preferred 
alternative means.304 If undercover activists’ reports and depictions of 
agricultural operations are misleading, as the Supreme Court indicated, 
“counterspeech” is more effective than passing laws restricting speech.305 
                                                            
 296. See ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 271. 
 297. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). 
 298. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Rac-
ism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). 
 299. See Idaho MSJ, supra note 17, at 18 (“Narrow tailoring requires legislators take a scalpel 
to excise a precise evil, but the Idaho General Assembly instead took a hatchet to the First Amend-
ment rights of whistleblowers in the agricultural industry.”). 
 300. Liebmann, supra note 44, at 594. 
 301. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 302. Id. at 2549. 
 303. Id. at 2550 (citations omitted). 
 304. Liebmann, supra note 44, at 594. 
 305. Id. 
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Furthermore, as discussed previously, fraud, trespass, and defama-
tion laws306 already exist to protect legitimate governmental interests.307 
Particularly in Idaho, where the ag-gag law “criminalizes all misrepre-
sentations to gain access for any reason and all audiovisual recordings of 
any agricultural activity,”308 such law is not narrowly tailored and re-
stricts significantly more speech than is necessary. Therefore, because 
the ag-gag laws do not serve a compelling interest and are not narrowly 
tailored, they cannot survive scrutiny. 
B. The (Un)Constitutionality of Veggie Libel Laws 
Although courts have not addressed the constitutionality of veggie 
libel laws,309 legal scholarship has extensively explored the arguments 
regarding the constitutionality of this type of legislation. The overwhelm-
ing scholarly opinion is that these laws do not pass constitutional mus-
ter310 “precisely because the goal is to deter speech that enjoys First 
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Amendment protection.”311 As a result, the reasons to challenge the stat-
utes are plentiful.312 The statutes violate fundamental First Amendment 
principles by making actionable protected speech regarding matters of 
serious public concern.313 These statutes are also impermissible content-
based regulations.314 Many of the laws fail to include the constitutional 
“fault” requirement,315 as well as the “of and concerning” element.316 The 
burden of proof and provision of punitive damages in many of the stat-
utes violates constitutional principles.317 Furthermore, to the extent that 
the statutes limit or prohibit speech in advance, they may be classified as 
unconstitutional “prior restraints” on free speech,318 and thus, they are 
unconstitutional.319 
The majority of these arguments are derived from well-established 
principles developed since the United States Supreme Court constitution-
alized defamation law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.320 Since that 
seminal case, although the Supreme Court has not directly stated that 
First Amendment principles apply to disparagement, several cases sug-
gest that where the alleged injury is the damaging effect of speech, First 
Amendment protections still apply, regardless of the cause of action.321 
This issue was addressed squarely by the California Supreme Court: 
Although the limitations that define the First Amendment’s zone of 
protection for the press were established in defamation actions, they 
are not peculiar to such actions but apply to all claims whose gra-
vamen is the alleged injurious falsehood of a statement: “that con-
                                                                                                                                     
Perishable Product Disparagement Laws and Free Speech, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (1998); 
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stitutional protection does not depend on the label given the stated 
cause of action,” and no cause of action can “claim . . . talismanic 
immunity from constitutional limitations.”322 
The court further stated that “it is immaterial for First Amendment pur-
poses whether the statement in question relates to the plaintiff himself or 
merely to his property broadly defined.”323 Thus, because agricultural 
disparagement laws involve the same state interest in protecting reputa-
tion and preventing economic harm, the constitutional limitations on def-
amation law also apply to agriculture disparagement.324 
1. Food as a Matter of Public Concern 
Discourse about food raises issues “of grave public concern.”325 
Such discussion 
may be overtly political (e.g., talk of FDA regulations), family re-
lated (e.g., children and nutrition), religiously oriented (e.g., keep-
ing kosher), communal (e.g., local food co-ops), economically fo-
cused (e.g., escalating food prices), environmentally centered (e.g., 
organic foods, or impact of toxins on food), or it may be health-
related (e.g., cholesterol and heart disease).326 
Issues regarding food safety, consumer protection, and the environment 
are of public concern because they can be “fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”327 
As Judge Mary Lou Robinson stated in Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey: “It 
would be difficult to conceive of any topic of discussion that could be of 
greater concern and interest to all Americans than the safety of the food 
that they eat.”328 
As the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan estab-
lished,329 a state’s regulation of alleged defamation regarding matters of 
public concern is limited; a standard of “intentional falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth” protects speech concerning issues of public con-
                                                            
 322. Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182–83 (Cal. 1986) (internal citations omit-
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cern.330 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public official must 
demonstrate “that the injurious statement was made with ‘actual mal-
ice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not.”331 
In New Jersey, courts have expressly extended First Amendment 
protections to food safety issues in the media.332 Dairy Stores, Inc. v. 
Sentinel Publishing Co. concerned a food store’s suit against a newspa-
per that had published an article stating that a product the store sold was 
not “natural spring water” because lab tests had revealed high concentra-
tions of chlorine.333 The court in that case held that “news stories about 
the quality or contents of products and services . . . should receive the 
same protection as those dealing with public officials and public fig-
ures.”334 All veggie libel statutes regulate speech concerning the quality 
and safety of food. Thus, in all cases, the constitutional protections man-
dated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan should apply to consumer dis-
course about agricultural and aquacultural products.335 
2. Agriculture Disparagement Laws as Content-Based Regulations 
Veggie libel statutes are fundamentally flawed because they violate 
the principle that “the government may not regulate speech based on its 
substantive content or the message it conveys.”336 By regulating a partic-
ular type of product (agricultural), creating a particular definition of inju-
ry, and providing a special remedy, the disparagement statutes “protect[] 
the agricultural and aquacultural industries like [they] protect[] no others; 
[they] grant these industries a special and higher level of immunity from 
criticism by allowing for civil cause of action unavailable to any other 
producers of products.”337 These laws are contrary to the First Amend-
ment premise that “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively inva-
lid.”338 Such an unconstitutional posture reflects an impermissible “hos-
tility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message.”339 Their provi-
sions “prohibit[] otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the 
                                                            
 330. Collins, supra note 18, at 9. 
 331. Id. at 279–80. 
 332. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., Inc., 465 A.2d 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
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subjects the speech addresses.”340 The effect of such preferential treat-
ment to the agricultural sector is to impermissibly “drive certain ideas or 
viewpoints from the marketplace.”341 
3. Fault Standards & Constitutional Requirements 
The fault standards in defamation cases are well established. In 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,342 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered state defamation laws in the context of the First Amendment 
right to free speech and held that a public official must demonstrate “that 
the [defamatory] statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.”343 The Supreme Court later extended this standard beyond 
public officials to all “public figures” who sought recovery for libel.344 A 
lower standard is permissible if the plaintiff is not a public figure. In 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court held that “so long as they 
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”345 However, 
Gertz also established that a private plaintiff must prove actual malice to 
recover presumed and punitive damages, even though such a plaintiff can 
recover compensatory damages without proving actual malice.346 
The veggie libel statutes include a variety of fault standards, many 
of which violate the principles summarized above. For example, Louisi-
ana, Ohio, and Oklahoma establish liability for a disparaging statement 
that the speaker “knows or should have known” was false.347 “Should 
have known” is a negligence standard.348 Similarly, Alabama law states: 
“It is no defense under this article that the actor did not intend, or was 
unaware of, the act charged.”349 A negligent defendant could therefore be 
found liable under Alabama’s disparagement law. According to Gertz, 
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negligence is a permissible standard of proof only if a food libel plaintiff 
is not a public figure.350 High-profile corporate food producers that could 
be deemed public figures must prove malice.351 Although Gertz also pro-
hibits private plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages under these 
statutes without a showing of actual malice,352 Alabama and Ohio ex-
pressly allow for the award of punitive damages,353 and Louisiana and 
Oklahoma provide for “other appropriate relief” in addition to punitive 
damages.354 
If corporate agricultural operations suing for disparagement are 
considered public figures, or if they seek punitive damages, Supreme 
Court precedent requires that the operations would have to prove mal-
ice.355 By allowing recovery based on a negligence standard, many veg-
gie libel statutes apply a lower fault standard, which is unconstitution-
al.356 
4. The “Of and Concerning” Element 
The veggie libel statutes also lack the “of and concerning” element 
set forth in Sullivan, which requires that the alleged defamatory state-
ment was about a defendant or a specific product.357 In Sullivan, an ad-
vertisement appeared in the New York Times that did not fully identify 
the plaintiff by name.358 The Court held that “the evidence was constitu-
tionally defective in . . . [that] it was incapable of supporting the jury’s 
finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made ‘of and concern-
ing’ respondent.”359 Under most of the veggie libel laws, anyone in-
volved in the “chain from grower to consumer”360 can sue. Such “imper-
sonal attack[s]” on speech about large groups could result in potentially 
limitless liability, which in turn could stifle public debate in a manner 
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intolerable under the First Amendment.361 Therefore, the veggie libel 
statutes that lack an “of and concerning” clause are constitutionally defi-
cient.362 
5. Burden of Proof: Requiring Defendants to Prove “Truth” 
Plaintiffs have the burden of proof in defamation cases involving 
matters of public concern.363 In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff suing a media outlet for defamation 
must prove falsity when the alleged falsity is a matter of public con-
cern.364 “We believe that the common law’s rule on falsity—that the de-
fendant must bear the burden of proving truth—must similarly fall here 
to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of show-
ing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.”365 However, 
many veggie libel statutes appear to unconstitutionally place the burden 
of proof on the speaker.366 These states define falsity based on the speak-
er’s lack of “reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data”367 
forming the basis of their speech. Rather than requiring the plaintiff to 
prove the falsity of a statement, these statutes require the speaker to 
prove the scientific basis for a statement—in other words, the truth.368 
Several scholars have discussed the difficulty of evaluating scientific 
data. To illustrate: “Health dangers that may not be acknowledged at one 
time, may be universally accepted later. Think about lead, bendectin, 
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DES, PCBs, and, yes, tobacco.”369 Regulating speech pertaining to public 
health or safety does “not allow[] time and the advance of human 
knowledge to take its course.”370 In other words, the statutes fail to “pro-
vide the necessary breathing space for the testing of hypothesis [sic] nec-
essary to safeguard diverse forms of scientific inquiry whenever they 
contradict established scientific facts or data.”371 
C. Ag-Gag & Veggie Libel Laws Are Unsound Policy 
In addition to the constitutional and public policy arguments against 
the laws, ag-gag and veggie libel laws are unlikely to protect the agricul-
tural industry from reputational harms. To the contrary, “ag-gag laws 
guarantee one thing for certain: increased distrust of American farmers 
and our food supply in general.”372 An informal poll on an industry blog 
may suggest that agricultural lobbyists are out of touch with farmers’ 
beliefs about the legal measures for which they are advocating. For ex-
ample, in response to the question of whether “ag gag laws [are] a good 
idea for the livestock industry to pursue,” sixty-three percent of animal 
farmers answered: “No, livestock ag has nothing to hide and such laws 
give the impression that we do.”373 In contrast, thirty-five percent are in 
favor of the legislative measures.374 The laws are also out of touch with 
the overwhelming majority of Americans. In a 2011 poll in Iowa, only 
twenty-one percent of voters indicated their support of Iowa’s ag-gag 
bill.375 A national poll commissioned by the ASPCA revealed that seven-
ty-one percent of Americans support undercover investigative efforts by 
animal welfare organizations to expose animal abuse on industrial farms, 
including fifty-four percent who strongly support the efforts.376 Accord-
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ingly, almost two-thirds (sixty-four percent) of Americans oppose mak-
ing undercover investigations of animal abuse on industrial farms illegal, 
with half of all Americans strongly opposing ag-gag laws.377 
As one writer for the agricultural industry explained: “Slamming 
the barn door shut when the public is asking for the transparency of a 
screen door sends the wrong message and plays into the hands of activ-
ists who will say to a suddenly more receptive audience, ‘They must 
have something truly awful to hide if they have to pass laws like 
that.’”378 In light of consumers’ growing distrust of Big-Ag, resisting 
transparency by enacting and enforcing laws such as ag-gag and veggie 
libel laws are likely to harm, rather than protect, the industry. 
VII. NON-LEGAL TOOLS: OPENING THE BARNYARD DOOR 
Food producers, distributors, and providers, from grocers and res-
taurants to industry organizations, are responding to the calls for trans-
parency. Rather than stifling speech, the following discussion provides 
an overview of the market functioning as it should—changing in re-
sponse to consumer demand. Rather than stifling the conversation about 
food production, certain initiatives by the industry attempt to appropri-
ately further the dialogue in the “marketplace of ideas,” as the First 
Amendment intended. 
A. Retailers 
Grocers and retailers as diverse as Whole Foods and Walmart are 
making efforts to “[s]how[] consumers where food comes from.”379 
Whole Foods is the first national grocery chain to set a deadline for full 
genetically modified organism (GMO) transparency and has committed 
to labeling all food products in U.S. and Canadian stores to indicate 
whether they contain GMOs by 2018.380 They have also developed 
standards and a rating system, such as color-coded animal welfare stand-
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ards for meat,381 sustainability standards for seafood,382 and most recent-
ly, “Responsibly Grown” ratings for produce and flowers383 that measure 
soil health, air quality, waste reduction, farmworker welfare, water con-
servation and protection, ecosystems and biodiversity, and pest manage-
ment practices.384 Whole Foods has adopted Global Animal Partnership’s 
5-Step Animal Welfare Rating program, which outlines specific hus-
bandry and management practices that promote farm animal welfare. For 
example, Step 1 prohibits the use of cages, crates, or crowding.385 Whole 
Foods claims: “Before we do any purchasing, we know exactly how the 
animal was raised, what it ate and where it came from. And, we’ve done 
the research to give you the most responsibly raised selection of meat 
and poultry around.” 386 
In October 2014, Walmart announced its commitment to create a 
more sustainable food system and identified its goal of meeting “an in-
creasing consumer demand for greater food transparency.”387 The com-
pany launched its “Safe and Transparent” campaign, recognizing that 
“[a] transparent food chain fosters improved food safety, worker safety, 
and animal welfare.”388 In its announcement, Walmart indicated that it 
“will work to provide more information and transparency about the 
products on its shelves so customers can see where an item came from, 
how it was made, and decode the ingredient label.”389 The company’s 
initiative includes the creation of a database that tracks water use, green-
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house gas emissions, and solid waste production, which can be used to 
form an index of a product’s lifecycle impact.390 
B. Restaurants 
The fast food industry is also undergoing changes in response to 
market pressures. In October 2014, McDonald’s launched the “Your 
Questions, Our Food” transparency campaign.391 Recognizing that con-
sumers question the sources and preparation of its food, Kevin Newell, 
executive vice president and chief brand and strategy officer at McDon-
ald’s USA, explained that the campaign is “our move to ensure we en-
gage people in a two-way dialogue about our food and answer the ques-
tions and address their comments.”392 On its website, for example, 
McDonald’s discloses the ingredients in its french fries,393 and answers 
customers’ questions, such as: “How do you care for the animals within 
your supply chain?”394 McDonald’s even tackled the question: “Have you 
ever used so-called ‘pink slime’ in your burgers?”395 
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C. Industry Organizations 
Recognizing that Big-Ag’s image needed a makeover, the biggest 
players in the food industry have launched a series of campaigns to re-
spond to negative publicity due to animal abuse incidents captured by 
undercover videos.396 The Center for Food Integrity (CFI), a not-for-
profit organization representing farmers, ranchers, universities, food pro-
cessors, restaurants, retailers, and food companies, was established in 
2007 to “build consumer trust and confidence in today’s food system.”397 
CFI acknowledged the industry’s need for a new approach in response to 
litigation, pressure on food companies, and legislation initiated by oppo-
nents of “today’s food system.”398 The industry’s response to such oppo-
sition and pressure to change has historically been to “attack[] the attack-
ers and [use] science alone to justify current practices.”399 CFI’s 2013 
Consumer Trust in the Food System Research report concluded that 
“[n]ot only are these approaches ineffective in building stakeholder trust 
and support, they increase suspicion and skepticism that the food indus-
try is worthy of public trust.”400 The calls for transparency have thus 
been successful in forcing the food industry to recognize that “[a]s con-
sumer values change, the food system needs to evaluate and potentially 
                                                            
 396. See Farm & PR Groups Wrestle with National ‘Ag Image’ Campaign, AGRI-PULSE (Sept. 
8, 2010), an industry report that discusses the use of media to successfully rebrand agriculture, such 
as the Corn Refiners Association’s multimedia advertising campaign’s TV, newspaper, magazine, 
and online ads, “which use humor to drive home the message that HFCS ‘is made from corn, it’s 
natural, and like sugar, it’s fine in moderation.’” According to the report, the media campaign was to 
be a “‘preemptive strike’ against ‘a long list of new regulations and restrictions coming out of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Food & Drug Ad-
ministration, ranging from tighter rules on pesticide applications to a potential ban of routine, pre-
ventative use of animal antibiotics.’” Id. 
 397. Who Are We?, CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, http://www.foodintegrity.org/about-us (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2015). Members of CFI include the American Farm Bureau Federation, ConAgra 
Foods, Grocery Manufacturers Association, McDonald’s Corporation, Nestle, Cargill, Coca-Cola 
Company, Monsanto, Walmart, Smithfield Foods, and Tyson Foods, Inc., among many others. 
Overview, CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, http://www.foodintegrity.org/membership (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2015). Missing from the membership list, however, are organic farmers. “This represents 
everything we are working against,” said Bill Deusing, head of the Northeast Organic Farming As-
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modify current practices and fundamentally change the way it communi-
cates in order to maintain consumer trust.”401 
In response to the surveys revealing prevalent “big food is bad”402 
attitudes among consumers, CFI, in partnership with Iowa State Univer-
sity, created a novel “research-based consumer trust model” to build trust 
in the food system.403 The research demonstrates, “It’s not just about giv-
ing consumers more science, more research, more information. It’s about 
demonstrating that you share their values when it comes to topics they 
care about most—safe food, quality nutrition, appropriate animal care, 
environmental stewardship and others.”404 CFI launched the “A New 
Conversation About Food” campaign “[t]o better address consumer ques-
tions and create a new platform for public engagement.” 405 According to 
Charlie Arnot, CFI’s CEO, “[t]he current discussion about food is result-
ing in more polarization, and at times, less informed decision-
making. . . . A fresh approach is needed to successfully create a new 
conversation based on authentic transparency and increased engagement 
to better align with consumer values and expectations and increase con-
sumer trust.”406 CFI’s Project Public Voice initiative provides resources 
such as messaging and training to farmers and food producers to help 
them respond to consumer concerns about the food system.407 
In direct response to undercover campaigns which “have height-
ened public attention on animal care issues,”408 CFI created the Animal 
Care Review Panel “to provide a balanced analysis of undercover video 
investigations,”409 “foster a more balanced conversation and to provide 
credible feedback to promote continuous improvement in farm animal 
care.”410 The Panel, comprised of animal care specialists, veterinarians, 
                                                            
 401. Id. 
 402. What Consumers Think, CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, http://www.foodintegrity.org/ 
research/what_consumers_think (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 403. Cracking the Code on Food Issues: Insights from Moms, Millennials and Foodies, 
CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, http://www.foodintegrity.org/research/2014-research (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2015). 
 404. Id. 
 405. CFI Launches a New Conversation About Food, CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, 
http://www.foodintegrity.org/programs/newconversation (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 406. Id. 
 407. Programs: Project Public Voice, CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, http://www.foodintegrity 
.org/programs/public-voice (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 408. Expert Panel Addresses New Hidden Camera Investigation, CENTER FOR FOOD 
INTEGRITY (July 17, 2012), http://www.foodintegrity.org/document_center/download/News_section/ 
ACRPstatement7-17-12FINAL.pdf. 
 409. Programs: Pork Panel, CENTER FOR FOOD INTEGRITY, http://www.foodintegrity.org/ 
programs/pork-panel (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 410. Expert Panel Addresses New Hidden Camera Investigation, supra note 408. 
2015] Transparency and Ag-Gag & Veggie Libel Laws 1395 
animal scientists, and ethicists, examines video and provides its expertise 
for food retailers; the pork, dairy, and poultry industries; and the me-
dia.411 The Panel operates independently and its assessments are not 
submitted to the industry for review or approval prior to publication.412 
The Panel of farm animal care specialists analyzed a four-minute 
undercover video posted on the Internet on July 16, 2012, by Mercy for 
Animals.413 Although Panel members generally agreed that “some condi-
tions and practices seen in the video could be improved,” they concluded 
that “most of what is shown does not indicate animals were abused or 
neglected.”414 One Panel member summarized the situation: “Overall, 
these animals were well taken care of. There were no signs of animal 
cruelty, abuse or neglect. The sows were clean, free of lesions, calm[,] 
and in good condition.”415 Another Panel member stated that the video’s 
claim “that gestation stalls are cruel” was not supported by the footage.416 
Another Panel member notes that images of sows “laying with legs and 
udders partially extending into adjacent stalls” were “troublesome” be-
cause “this could raise issues of comfort and safety.”417 Regarding the 
footage of employees euthanizing piglets by striking their heads against 
the concrete floor, the panel members noted that “this use of blunt force 
trauma, while controversial, is accepted by the American Veterinary 
Medical Association and the American Association of Swine Veterinari-
ans (AASV).”418 
To reach a larger audience and answer the public’s questions re-
garding controversial issues surrounding food production, such as animal 
welfare, antibiotics, food safety, GMOs, hormones, and growth tools, 
USFRA, consisting of more than eighty farmer-led and rancher-led or-
ganizations and agricultural partners, launched a “Food Dialogues” initi-
ative in 2011.419 USFRA held a series of panel discussions “to engage in 
                                                            
 411. Programs: Pork Panel, supra note 409. 
 412. Expert Panel Addresses New Hidden Camera Investigation, supra note 408. 
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dialogue with consumers who have questions about how today’s food is 
grown and raised.”420 In a 2014 Integrity in Food Marketing Dialogue, 
panelists addressed the question of whether consumers are “satisfied with 
how farmers take care of their livestock.”421 Robin R. Ganzert, president 
and CEO of the animal protection organization American Humane Asso-
ciation (AHA), explained that there is a disconnect between agricultural 
practices and consumers’ knowledge and education about the food sup-
ply.422 She explained that consumers’ lack of trust in the food industry 
can be solved through dialogue and education.423 The most recent Dia-
logue in January 2015 was comprised of food industry and animal care 
experts who discussed animal health and food safety issues relevant to 
the dairy industry.424 
In addition to engaging the public in “dialogues” to counter nega-
tive messages about the agricultural industry, CFI is also addressing the 
issue of animal abuse through its See it? Stop it! national initiative.425 
This program, launched in 2013, provides educational materials regard-
ing animal protection and “encourages and empowers its employees” to 
report instances of animal abuse, neglect, harm, or mishandling.426 To 
participate in the program, farm owners and managers agree to investi-
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gate each employee report and take full action to correct any such in-
stances.427 As Roxi Beck of the Center for Food Integrity explained: 
“Those in agriculture are understandably frustrated by undercover vide-
os. The actions of a few captured on video can taint public perception of 
the entire livestock community. Taking action to stop abuse demonstrates 
a genuine commitment to do what’s right for the animals on farms.”428 
Although a list of participating farms will not be published, farmers are 
encouraged to promote their participation in the initiative.429 The initia-
tive has been endorsed by the AHA.430 According to Kathi Brock, Na-
tional Director of the Farm Animal Program for AHA, the See it? Stop 
it! program provides the tools to set clear expectations of zero tolerance 
for animal mistreatment and establish a system for reporting abuse that 
assures proper care of farm animals.431 
Evaluating the motives and merits of these newly formed industry 
organizations and initiatives is beyond the scope of this Article; however, 
they demonstrate the possibility of alternative means of industry protec-
tion from negative information. Just as the First Amendment intended, 
counterspeech, not suppression of speech, should be the means to dispute 
allegedly misleading information. Food production practices, along with 
their effects on animal and human health and the environment, are criti-
cal matters of public concern that should be thoroughly debated in the 
public sphere. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Ag-gag and veggie libel laws “have created a new right—the right 
to produce a consumer good without public discourse about its safety and 
healthfulness.”432 However, because “food safety is a matter of grave 
public concern,”433 such speech “is at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
protection”434 and should thus be vigorously protected. Not only are the-
se laws constitutionally suspect, they reflect poor public policy. Infor-
mation revealed through undercover investigations and by outspoken 
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critics “[is] vital to citizens in a complex society who cannot begin to 
understand, let alone evaluate, every product on the market.”435 The agri-
cultural industry pledged its commitment to helping consumers make 
informed decisions about food.436 Rendering better-informed judgments 
requires a free flow of information437 that the ag-gag and veggie libel 
laws seek to suppress. 
The laws are also unlikely to have their intended effect—to protect 
the status quo. Rather, they are likely to inspire further distrust of the 
current industrial food system. While these laws and their deterrent ef-
fects may protect products and prevent economic hardship for industry, 
they may also be viewed as undue government and corporate interference 
on the free exchange of information that can contribute to greater under-
standing of the food system by Americans.438 
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